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Rapid urbanization is a pressing global issue. The number of urban 
slum-dwellers living in squalid conditions is growing rapidly. This issue is 
especially urgent in fast-growing Asia. The governments of these countries are 
attempting, or have attempted, to address the slum problem through providing 
alternative low-cost public or private housing. However, the slum-clearance 
through resettlement experiences of many countries were fraught with 
difficulties like resistance to resettlement, and the failure to provide affordable 
alternative housing. In contrast, Singapore's experience since independence 
was relatively successful. Urban shophouse and rural kampong slums were 
redeveloped with minimal resistance. Most resettlers were resettled into 
affordable public housing. There are no slums in Singapore today. This 
experience is one that officials from many Asian countries are trying to learn 
from.  
 
The lessons from Singapore's slum-clearance and resettlement to public 
housing experiences are well-documented. However, there is a gap in the 
literature dealing with the resettlement phase. Existing literature records that 
Singapore's resettlement to public housing experience was relatively smooth 
because of the low level of resistance to resettlement from urban and rural 
slum-dwellers.  
 
A review of current literature on Singapore’s housing experience and 
related case studies reveals a total of eleven causal variables argued - in 
different combinations by authors - to be the reasons behind the relatively 
ix 
 
successful slum-clearance through resettlement to public housing program. 
These factors are 1) effective supporting policies, 2) strong political support, 3) 
availability of 4) quality and 5) affordable housing 6) at a good location, 7) 
absence of corruption, 8) fair compensation, 9) a measured approach to 
eviction, 10) social and cultural factors, and 11) geographical factors. However, 
there is no substantiated discourse on how these eleven causal variables 
influenced the outcome of low resistance.  
 
The questions above were not able to be discussed because of a data 
gap. There is a lack of studies into the sentiments, perceptions and choice-
making of resettlers before the resettlement. In response, this paper presents a 
study that investigated the puzzle of:  
 
How did the multitude of causal variables cited in existing 
literature influenced the outcome of a low resistance to 
resettlement to public housing in Singapore between 1965 and 
1985?  
 
Drawing from a normative assertion of Cultural Theory, which argues 
that a “clumsy” approach to “wicked” problems will influence a positive 
outcome, an ethnographical study was conducted to validate the hypothesis of:  
 
The eleven factors shaped the outcome of low resistance 
because the totality of factors constituted a clumsy approach 
which avoided the pitfalls to a viable resettlement to public 
x 
 
housing program. The resulting program catered to the 
multitude of resettler preferences and deterred the realization 
of any preference to resist.  
 
This study shows that firstly, the eleven factors constituted a clumsy 
approach. Secondly, this clumsy approach enabled Singapore to avoid the 
pitfalls that halted resettlement programs in other Asian countries. Thirdly, the 
findings validate that the resettlement program catered to the multitude of 
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Rapid urbanization is one of the most pressing global issues affecting 
the human condition today. The population of slum-dwellers are growing 
rapidly in cities, placing large numbers of people in unacceptable squalid 
conditions. In fast-growing Asia - where rural to urban migration follows the 
trajectory of economic growth, this problem can only get worse. The 
governments of these countries are attempting, or have attempted, to address 
this problem through resettling these slum-dwellers to low-cost public or 
private housing. However, the slum-clearance and resettlement to low-cost 
housing experiences of many countries are fraught with difficulties. These road 
blocks range from resistance to resettlement
1
 to the governments’ inability to 
meet the demand for affordable alternative housing.  
 
In contrast, between 1965 and 1985 (the first 20 years of Singapore's 
post-independence slum-clearing through resettlement to public housing 
endeavours), Singapore’s experience was relatively successful. Urban 
shophouse slums and rural kampong
2
 slums were redeveloped with minimal 
resistance. The majority of the slum-dwellers were resettled into affordable 
public housing. Today, there are no slums in Singapore – save for the few 
                                                 
1
 This paper uses the term “Resettlement” as a more appropriate term to describe the program 
under study here. Terms like “Relocation” or “Reestablishment” do not accurately capture the 




 The term “Kampong” is used in this paper to refer to a village or community in the sub-urban 
or rural areas of Singapore. There is no differentiation between a Chinese or Malay Kampong. 
The individual houses in Kampongs will be referred to as “Kampong houses”; and the 
occupants of these kampong houses will be referred to as “kampong-dwellers”. Kampongs in 




kampong dwellings that were conserved. This experience is one that officials 
from many countries are trying to learn from. As the majority of these countries 
are Asian, this paper will focus on comparing the experiences of Singapore and 
these Asian countries.  
 
The lessons that these Asian countries can learn from Singapore's slum-
clearance and resettlement to public housing experience are well-documented 
in areas of policy, satisfaction of living conditions and environment, home-
ownership schemes, ethic-quotas for purposes of nation-building, and even 
housing as political legitimacy, to name a few. The literature records that 
Singapore's resettlement to public housing
3
 experience was relatively 
successful because of the low level of resistance to resettlement from urban and 
rural slum-dwellers. However, there exists a gap in the literature dealing with 
the resettlement phase. 
 
A review of current literature on Singapore’s housing experience and 
related case studies reveals a total of eleven causal variables argued - in 
different combinations by authors - to be the reasons behind the relatively 
successful slum-clearance through resettlement to public housing program. 
These factors are 1) effective supporting policies, 2) strong political support, 3) 
availability of 4) quality and 5) affordable housing 6) at a good location, 7) 
absence of corruption, 8) fair compensation, 9) a measured approach to 
                                                 
3
 This paper is careful to distinguish between “resettlement and public housing efforts / 
endeavour / programs” with “resettlement to public housing efforts / endeavour / programs”. 
The former is used when resettlement and public housing are discussed separately as each is a 
massive undertaking in their own right. For example, a country might embark on a resettlement 
program from one private urban estate to another; while another might actually be following 
Singapore’s example of resettling from private dwellings to public housing. The “resettlement 




eviction, 10) social and cultural factors, and 11) geographical factors. However, 
there is no substantiated discourse on how these eleven causal variables 
influenced the outcome of low resistance. In other words, how did the list of 
factors above influenced the choice of resettlers to either volunteer for 
resettlement or not resist forced resettlement? Which factor played a bigger 
role? Also, as no authors cited the same combination of variables in their work, 
is there a certain combination of variables that is sufficient for low resistance, 
or are all variables necessary? 
  
The review of existing literature also reveals that the questions above 
were not able to be discussed because of a data gap. There is a lack of studies 
into the sentiments, perceptions and choice-making of resettlers before the 
resettlement. While there were quite a few studies conducted to investigate the 
sentiments of resettlers when they were in their new public housing dwellings, 
there are no studies that investigated why they did not resist the move in the 
first place.  
 
These literature and data gaps need to be addressed because the 
knowledge of the conditions needed for low resistance to resettlement will aid 
developing countries’ current slum-clearance and resettlement to low-cost 
housing efforts to mitigate the effects of rapid urbanization. Simply knowing 
the factors, and then installing them without understanding of the causal 
mechanisms behind how the factors influenced the outcomes, may not replicate 
another successful experience. Only by understanding the causal mechanisms 
can policy-makers from countries learning from Singapore adapt what they 
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learned to their context. 
 
In response, this paper presents a study that investigated the puzzle of:  
 
How did the multitude of causal variables cited in existing 
literature influenced the outcome of a low resistance to 
resettlement to public housing in Singapore between 1965 and 
1985? What is the causal mechanism(s) that allowed the 
variables to shape the outcomes? 
 
This paper will be presented in five chapters. Chapter 1 sets the context 
of the study and reviews the experience of Asian countries conducting slum-
clearance through resettlement to low-cost housing. The discussion of their 
experience will be divided into two main themes: the challenges of providing 
low-cost alternative housing, and the challenge of resettling slum-dwellers. 
Likewise, it also presents an overview of the slum-clearance through 
resettlement to public housing programs of Singapore in these two themes. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature and data on Singapore’s resettlement to public 
housing phase. Existing explanations, the literature gap and the data gap will 
be discussed. Chapter 3 presents the design of the study - outlining its 
objective, hypothesis, research method, sampling, and data collection. Chapter 
4 presents the survey findings. Chapter 5 presents the analysis of the data, and 




CHAPTER 1:  
CONTEXT OF STUDY 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. THE CHALLENGE OF RAPID URBANIZATION 
 
Rapid urbanization is a contemporary global issue that requires urgent 
attention. The world urban population is expected to increase by 84 per cent by 
2050, from 3.4 billion in 2009 to 6.3 billion in 2050.
4
 Half of humanity now 
lives in cities, and within two decades, nearly 60 per cent of the world’s people 
will be urban-dwellers. “With more than half of the world’s population now 
living in urban areas”, says Mr Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, “this is the urban century”.5  
 
Anna K. Tibaijuka, Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of 
United Nations Human Settlements Programme at UN-HABITAT, tells us that 
“urban growth is most rapid in the developing world, where cities gain an 
average of 5 million residents every month”.6 Mr Ban adds that “cities embody 
some of society’s most pressing challenges, from pollution and disease to 
unemployment and lack of adequate shelter.”7 Most cities are unable to provide 
formal housing for these new residents. Consequently, informal settlements 
like slums and shanty towns grew rapidly. Such informal settlements 
compounds further the already strained urban conditions. For example, as Ms 
Tibaijuka states:  
                                                 
4
 World Urbanization Prospect,  
5







“The world is also confronting the challenge of increasing 
disparities between the rich and the poor… urban inequality has a 
direct impact on all aspects of human development, including 
health, nutrition, gender equality and education. In cities where 
spatial and social divisions are stark or extreme, lack of social 
mobility tends to reduce people’s participation in the formal 
sector of the economy and their integration in society. This 
exacerbates insecurity and social unrest which, in turn, diverts 
public and private resources from social services and productive 
investments to expenditures for safety and security.”8 
 
2. URBANIZATION AND POVERTY IN ASIA 
 
The lack of access to housing is one of the most serious and widespread 
consequences and causes of poverty. This problem is most pressing in Asia 
(Yuen, 2007). The largest proportion of the one billion people living in slums in 
the world is in the Asian region. About a quarter of the total urban population 
in Asia is living below the poverty line - although the proportion may be higher 
in some countries. India and China each holds about a third of the region’s 
urban population with many living in relative poverty (Jacquemin, 1999). In 
South Asia, slum and squatter settlement population constituted 58% of total 
urban population compared to 36.4% in East Asia and 28% in Southeast Asia. 
Of the 12 million people in Mumbai, for example, about 50 per cent lives in 
slums, dilapidated chawls and on pavements (Yuen, 2007). 





This challenge in Asia will continue to grow. Giok (2007) tells us that 
“the estimates are that more than 60% of the increase in the world’s urban 
population over the next three decades will be in Asia, mostly in China and 
India, but also in Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Nine out 
of 23 cities with populations of more than 10 million people are in Asia.” Many 
Asian countries are struggling to cope with this growth. For example, in Ho 
Chi Minh City in Vietnam, the Government and private developers struggle to 
house the new 50,000 migrants and 20,000 young urban households every year. 
Consequently, squatter and slum settlements now constitutes 15% of housing in 
the city (Giok, 2007). 
 
3. RESPONDING TO THIS CHALLENGE  
 
In response to the challenge of alleviating poverty and other social 
problems caused by rapid urbanization, Governments in Asia have for the past 
few decades been seeking to clear urban slums by taking over the land, evicting 
squatters, and providing low-cost housing for the urban poor. In Bangkok, 
Thailand, the Government set up the National Housing Authority (NHA) in 
1973 to build public housing in various forms - like high-rise apartments to 
terrace houses - to house evicted slum-dwellers (Yap, 1992). In Malaysia, the 
Government implemented a Special Low-cost Housing Scheme in 1985, with a 
target to build 80,000 low-cost houses annually for three years (1986-1989) 
(Khor, 1989: 8). In India, under the National Government Clearance and 
Resettlement Scheme, resettlement projects were carried out throughout India. 
(See Baken, 2003, for case studies). Up to 1983, the Government took care to 
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ensure nearly all new settlements were located near to their source settlements 
(324).  
 
In Hong Kong, due to the sudden influx of migrants in the late 1940s 
and the early 1950s, there is a “rapid growth in size of the squatter population 
which at one time constituted up to 25% of the entire population” (Wong, 
1978: 206). The government set out to clear the slums and resettle squatters 
with considerable success. In the 1960s and 70s, a massive resettlement 
programme shifted a majority of the population out of Hong Kong City (Fung, 
1978: 233). Since then, Hong Kong is “one of the very few countries where 
squatter population has been decreasing in size” (Wong, 1978: 206). In Manila 
in the Philippines, as early as 1949, “the Filipino Government launched public 
housing programs designed for low-income families and to accommodate 
evicted squatters” (Einhart, 1989: 13). When it failed, an ambitious project, 
Urban BLISS, was launched in 1979 to “develop depressed areas into model 
communities” of public housing (Ibid).  
 
In Jakarta in Indonesia, the Public Works Department set up 
PERUMNAS, a quasi-governmental consulting firm in 1974, to “help central 
and municipal governments supply low-cost housing, core housing and site-
and-services schemes” (Einhart, 1989: 30). In South Korea, from the 1960s to 
the 80s, the Government embarked on slum-clearing through resettlement to 
low-cost housing endeavours, particularly in Seoul (Mobrand, 2008). For 
example, from 1967 to 1971, officials led giant low-income housing projects 
like “The Citizens’ Apartments” project which involved building 90,000 units 
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in 2000 apartment buildings for evicted slum-dwellers (376). In Cambodia, the 
Government “has accepted housing as a critical means to achieve the goals of 
poverty reduction of its population specially the urban poor who live 
prevalently in Phnom Penh.” It is developing the National Housing Policy, and 
committing to a range of “guiding policies and commitments, including a 
Hundred Settlements Policy, to improve housing conditions of people to meet 
their basic needs for shelter…” (Bunnarith, 2004).  
 
In July 2012, ahead of the World Cities Summit in Singapore, Sri 
Lankan mayor Danasiri Amarathunga tells us that “there are a lot of shanty 
areas, squatters in Colombo city. We'll have to move them out, (but) we have to 
keep them inside Colombo city also for their work purposes.”9 In China, 
Municipal Governments set up Housing Settlement Project Offices to work 
with the Ministry of Construction to develop housing settlements. For example, 
the Shanghai Housing Settlement Project Office has since 1987 been resettling 
households to public housing.
10
 Meanwhile, Myanmar plans to build more than 




In the next sections (3.1 and 3.2), this paper will discuss the challenges 
faced by these Asian countries when conducting the two efforts that are critical 
for any slum-clearing efforts to work: providing low-cost alternative housing, 
and the delicate task of resettling slum-dwellers. 
                                                 
9
 Channel News Asia Online, “Poverty, pollution, infrastructure are key urban challenges: Lee 
Yi Shyan”, 01 Jul 2012,  available at 
<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/1210990/1/.html> 
10
 Shanghai Housing Settlement Project Office, Housing Settlement Project in Shanghai, 
available at < http://www.unesco.org/most/asia7.htm>  
11




3.1 The Challenge of Providing Low-Cost Housing 
 
The governments that undertook the task of providing low-cost housing 
for the urban poor would have found out that this task is a challenging one. It is 
not a straight forward building endeavour. Many Asian governments found it 
difficult to sustain a low-cost housing program. For example, the Government 
of Thailand encountered difficulties when it embarked on a Five-Year Plan 
(1976-1980) to construct 120,000 heavily subsidised housing units in Bangkok 
through the National Housing Authority (NHA). In the first three years, NHA 
constructed 36,868 apartments (Yap, 1992: 13). However, the project was 
cancelled in 1978 as it was deemed overambitious and unaffordable. A new 
plan, the Accelerated Plan 1979-1982, was initiated. However, this plan was 
abandoned too due to the reduced subsidies by the Thai Government. 
Consequently, to build up its ability to fund new projects to house the slum 
evictees, NHA started building houses for middle to upper-income Thais. But 
as the houses compete poorly with private housing, NHA was unable to build 
up the necessary funds to conduct what it was set up to do. As such, the impact 
of NHA on slum conditions in Bangkok was limited. 
 
Likewise, the Government of Malaysia encountered similar difficulties. 
Malaysia’s Special Low-cost Housing Scheme in 1985 was problematic as a 
large part of the population could not afford the houses. Khor (1989) tells us 
that “the crux of the housing problem is that the country’s building resources 
were channelled not towards where people’s needs are, but towards where the 
market which could pay was” (9). This was a consequence of the nature of 
11 
 
Malaysia’s system of providing low-cost housing, where private developers 
constitute a significant part of the endeavour. Most of the houses built by 
private developers are not catered to the low-income group. For example, the 
Third Malaysian Plan indicated that “hardly 1.1% of the 64,900 units built by 
private developers (in 1971-1975) can be considered low-cost” (20). 
Furthermore, the high cost of housing is also “contributed by the policies of 
financial institutions as well as manufacturers of building materials” (40). 
 
Another problem that arises from Malaysia’s system of engaging 
private developers to build public houses is that of abandonment of projects.  In 
1987, there were 184 abandoned housing projects involving more than 30,000 
houses (32). There are several reasons for such abandonments. In some cases, 
developers absconded with the 10% down-payment paid up front. Other 
reasons include “financial problems, conflicts or problems with Government 
agencies; or lack of experience and management; or progress payments from 
buyers are not used for the projects but instead channelled towards share 
speculation or given as loans to others, thus leading to shortage of money; or 
the company is in liquidation because of failure to settle debts” (Harun Din, 
1987: 52).  
 
As a result of the failures of the private developers to meet the targets 
of providing housing for the poor, in the 1990s, the Government directed the 
Employees Provident Fund (EPF) to “undertake large scale low and medium 
cost housing… meant to send a message to private developers that the 
Government would no longer tolerate the alleged excessive profits reaped by 
12 
 
private housing developers who did not reciprocate by building low cost 
housing required by government policy and conditions of approval” (Salleh, 
Lee, 1997: 1). However, this initiative did not work as the private developers 
have no incentive to provide cheap housing when the Government kept 
building them. 
 
In South Korea, from the 1960s to the 80s, the Government was unable 
to resolve the squatter problem through resettling slum dwellers to low-cost 
housing. In 1961, weeks after the coup that instated a new government, 
“thousands of illegal shacks were removed and the new government promised 
new housing for many of their occupants” (Mobrand, 2008: 374). However, 
public housing units were either insufficient to meet demand, or were too 
expensive for evicted slum-dwellers to afford. In the years that followed, 
thousands of evicted households were instead resettled to rural areas to reclaim 
agricultural land, and to work sites. Only 17,000 were relocated to apartments. 
Some 47,000 households were even resettled to detention camps on the 
outskirts of the city (Ibid). 
 
The Citizens’ Apartments project that the Government embarked on in 
1967 did not fully fulfil the intent to house evicted slum dwellers. Research 
shows that less than half of the apartments were occupied by evictees (337). 
Many evicted households were priced out of the housing. Worse still, one of 
the apartments collapsed, leaving 33 dead. The collapse was a result of corrupt 
officials who allowed “cheap, low-grade materials to be used” (Ibid). Plans for 
further building were promptly scrapped when 61 other apartments were found 
13 
 
to be dangerous (378). Another ambitious project, the Kwangju Housing 
Complex, was initiated as a satellite city to cater to displaced evictees in 1968. 
However, while the population of Kwangju swelled up to 27,000 in 1970, basic 
amenities like water, electricity, housing and food were in short supply. 
Families relocated to Kwangju “were continuing to move back to Seoul” (Ibid). 
Eventually, Kwangju was to be taken over by middle to upper class citizens 
due to the Government’s system of allowing private developers to develop the 
city, effectively pricing out poorer slum-evictees (378, 379).  
 
Housing prices continued to increase rapidly in the 1980s. Housing 
costs as a proportion of total family expenditure in South Korea “increased 
from 15.2 percent in 1978 to 29.9 percent in 1988” (MMUY, 1990: 50, 51). 
This was a consequence of the Government’s reliance on the private sector to 
provide housing to the population. The expenditure on housing only constituted 
0.86 percent of the South Korean Government budget, compared to, for 
example, Singapore’s 14.32 percent (Park, 1998: 276) and India’s 14.32 
percent (277). Furthermore, the housing financing system impeded the poorer 
families from being able to overcome the high prices through housing loans. 
The housing loans granted only accounted for 22.8 percent of housing prices 
(KRIHS 1990: 89).  
  
Lastly, in the Philippines, the Government’s public housing program 
launched in 1949 failed in providing mass low-cost housing for the poor. The 
reasons for this failure includes financial constraints, indebtedness, 
mismanagement, corruption, unaffordability of houses, rising costs of 
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construction materials, and design of dwellings not adapted to the needs of the 
occupants (Einhart, 1989: 13). Project Urban BLISS also fell short of target. 
The project eventually turned out to be a subsidy housing program for the 
middle-class (Ibid).  
 
3.2 The Challenge of Resettling Slum-Dwellers 
 
Other than the challenge of providing low-cost housing, Governments 
attempting to resolve the problems of rapid urbanization through the 
redevelopment of slums will find that resettling slum-dwellers is also not a 
straight-forward affair. Resettlement has always been a “sensitive issue”, 
Kleevens (1972: 56) tells us. He elaborates: 
 
Some governments solve problems of relocation ‘the easy 
way’, namely to ignore them. Families living on land-in areas 
selected for future development are given short notice. When 
the day has come, the shacks are taken down or even burnt 
down, leaving the affected families with much hardship. 
 
 From a psychological perspective, people who are being evicted faced a 
“grief syndrome”, which comes into play when people “formed an attachment 
to an area and are compelled to leave it” (Hassan, 1977). Fried (1963) shows us 
that in Boston, for example, 73 percent of female resettlers who indicated they 
liked their previous place “very much” gave evidence of extreme grief. In other 
studies, Young and Willmott (1957), Manle (1974), Martin et al. (1957) found 
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that resettlers in European countries suffered from mental and physical health 
problems due to forced relocation. Not surprisingly, ever since the efforts by 
Asian Governments to clear slums, resettlement has always been a significant 
challenge. 
 
The Government of Thailand faced considerable difficulties in 
resettling slum-dwellers. In 1988, the Thai Government embarked on a large-
scale relocation project – the Suwan Prasid 2 Resettlement Project (Yap, 1992: 
74). Due to the opening of new roads, the land where the slums occupied 
increased in value dramatically, prompting the Government to initiate the 
resettlement of slum occupants. The State Railways of Thailand (SRT) was 
assigned as the agency to conduct the eviction. The SRT’s and the developer’s 
initial compensation offer of 8500 Baht to the Rama IX Road settlement was 
only accepted by some households. The rest of the slum community organized 
themselves and proposed land-sharing instead. SRT and the developer rejected 
the proposal, and for the next 10 months negotiated with the community for an 
agreement (75). Eventually, the offer of 18,000 Baht was accepted by most of 
the households. SRT and the developer had to buy a 1.12 hectare of land to 
resettle the remaining 25 families (76).  
 
The Government of Hong Kong likewise faced challenges during their 
resettlement endeavours. In the late 1950s, it was reported that the morale of 
the Officers of the Squatter Control and Squatter Clearance Sections of the 
Resettlement Department was low. Staff in both sections, when conducting the 
task of enforcing the demolition of squatter structures, were faced with 
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“clamorous and genuine reactions of distress by the occupants” (Smart, 2006: 
169). The Officers actually endured attacks from the squatters, sometimes even 
with choppers (Ibid.)  
 
In 1959, Squatters conducted a “mass squatting”, an incident that 
attracted adverse publicity in the press (170). In the 60s and 70s, resistance to 
resettlement did not stop. “Increasing opposition has been voiced by squatters 
in the more central area who are affected by clearance and resettlement”, Fung 
(1978) tells us, “and the well-intentioned Government policy to alleviate the 
overcrowding problem in many of the old and rapidly deteriorating 
resettlement estates by moving people to new outlying estates has likewise 
received surprisingly little favourable response” (233). The main source of 
opposition was the location of the new housing. The majority of the families 
affected by resettlement preferred to stay in the city. It was a trade-off between 
ease of commute and quality of housing. On one hand, most of the jobs are 
located in the city. On the other hand, city slums are far inferior to the quality 
of housing the Hong Kong Government provided in the outlying areas (234). 
 
The Government of India encountered road-blocks to their resettlement 
efforts too. In many resettlement projects, whether actual movement takes 
place “is the outcome of a host of forces and counter forces embodied by the 
slum dwellers, their local and city-level leaders, the land owning agency, and 
the agency in-charged of relocation (Baken, 2003)”.Here, local politics wielded 
tremendous influence. Resistance from slum-dwellers became powerful if they 
suit the political agenda of the local political parties. The agencies involved had 
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to resort to “surprise tactics” and “announce shift immediately prior to its 
taking place” (325). Due to financial constraints, resettlement projects had to 
be conducted cheaply. As a result, evictees are relocated to undeveloped land 
termed “public waste” land where public amenities and utilities like water, gas, 
sanitation were absent. This caused considerable hardship for resettlers (326), 
and thus became a primary cause of resistance. 
 
The Indian Government also faced resistance in Bombay (former name 
of Mumbai). In 1975, slum dwellers from the Janata Colony resisted eviction, 
and filed a suit in the city civil court, obtaining a stay order. (Einhart, 1989: 
96). However, the state Government went ahead to forcibly evict the squatters. 
In response, the squatters organized themselves and formed the Bombay Slum 
Dwellers United Front (BSDUF) in June 1976. Through official channels and 
law courts, they attempted to cease evictions. However, evictions continued. In 
Oct 1977, the destruction of 4000 huts was carried out despite violent clashes 
between squatters and the police. This incident triggered the BSDUF to stage a 
“mammoth” rally on 21 Nov where 10,000 people marched on the heart of the 
city. As a result, evictions were temporarily halted (97). 
 
 In the Philippines, heavy-handed measures did not alleviate squatter 
problems. From 1963, the Filipino Government began mass evictions in 
Manila. Unlike most other countries, a large number of these evictees were not 
given compensation, were forcibly ejected from their homes, and were not 
resettled. Those who were provided with resettlement were relocated to sites 
40km from the city, where they were “dumped without employment, shelter 
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and public services” (Einhart, 1989: 11). As a result, “many resettlers simply 
abandoned the resettlement sites… in 1981, more than 36% of the relocated 
families returned to Manila, settling again in one of the capital’s 415 squatter 
colonies” (Ibid).   
 
 The resistance towards relocation got worst for the Filipino 
Government. In the late 1960s, “as a response to their plight, the indifference 
and hostility of the authorities and discrimination by the better-off sections of 
society, the squatters began to organize themselves (18). These groups 
established themselves with national politicians, created a strategy of self-help, 
and harnessed the power of collective action (20). They caused considerable 
friction to Government slum-clearing efforts. Eventually, the Government 
resolved the problems caused by these resistance groups by using the law to 
eliminate their influence and disbanding them (23). 
 
In South Korea, from the 1960s to the 1980s, the leaders of Seoul 
“repeatedly failed in their endeavour to clear the city’s shantytowns, despite the 
impressive coercive capability of the South Korean state” (Mobrand, 2008: 
368). Squatters resisted slum-clearing efforts in several ways. Firstly, slum 
dwellers protested at City Hall, demanding “time to prepare… and demolitions 
not to occur in winter” (374). Secondly, corruption was used as a tool of 
resistance. Some dwellers bought off officials implementing shack policies, 
assuring that their shacks will not be removed.  
 
Thirdly, the Seoul experience included physical resistance against the 
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demolition squads. At one time, up to 2000 residents resisted the efforts of 
some 350 policemen (Ibid). Battles would involve “residents throwing stones 
and riot police resorting to tear gas” (375). Lastly, “by far the most pervasive 
response to shack clearances was for evictees to return to commercial areas in 
the city and rebuild their settlements” (Ibid). Politics also played a part in 
allowing resistance to persist. For example, in the spring of 1967, as the 
National Assembly elections were impending, announcements that all illegal 
houses will be torn down were accompanied by lax monitoring. This is due to 
the Government’s wish not to upset the masses and thus risk election backlash 
(376). The dwellers took this opportunity to build more shacks. 
 
 The Malaysian Government, too, struggled against resistance to 
resettlement. The infamous case of resistance was named the Tasek Utara 
Struggle. In 1974, after hearing the promise by the Chief Minister that “all 
landless in the state will be given land by the government” (Khor, 1989: 60), a 
large number of landless families started to build houses on undeveloped state 
land in Tasek Utara. The squatters were under the impression that they will be 
able to keep the land they had “opened up”. However, they were soon served 
eviction orders. The squatters decided to stay. They tried all official channels of 
redress and appeal but officials even refused to meet them. On 15 Sep 1974, 
demolition squads moved in and started tearing down houses. The inhabitants 
refused to move and tried to obstruct the demolition. Riot police stepped in and 
forcibly dragged occupants out of their half-demolished houses. The squatters 
organized themselves and held a demonstration in front of the State 
Government Building. Soon, sympathisers from all walks of life joined in the 
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protests. The demonstrations spread to other states. The situation got so critical 
that, in order to avoid international attention, the Government sent in armed 
riot police and arrested all demonstrators (Einhart, 1989).  
 
4. THE SINGAPORE EXPERIENCE 
 
Clearly, the slum clearing and resettlement to public housing 
experiences of the Asian countries discussed above were fraught with 
difficulties. In contrast, Singapore's experience was relatively successful in 
terms of meeting the objectives of slum-clearance and resettlement of the slum-
dwellers to affordable public housing. This success was validated 
internationally when the then-Chairman of HDB, Mr Lim Kim San, was 
conferred the 1964 Ramon Magsaysay Award for Community Leadership for 
his efforts “in improving public housing in Singapore” (Quah, 1975: 1). 
Singapore was made a member of the United Nations Committee on Building, 
Housing and Planning in January 1967, a remarkable feat considering that 
Singapore was a small and young nation (2). In the next sections, this paper 
briefly presents the successful Singapore experience. 
 
4.1 Relative Success in Providing Low-Cost Public Housing 
 
In 1959, when Singapore attained self-rule, the new Government 
“inherited an extremely overcrowded city” (Park, 1998: 283). Density in the 
city centre reached 34,500 per km
2
 (Drakakis-Smith, Yeung, 1977: 2). The 
Government rejected “the popular but incremental construction of assisted self-
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help in low income housing” (Yuen, 2007) and embarked on a massive public 
housing program to provide basic shelter for the poor. The Government 
established the Housing Development Board (HDB) in 1960 and gave it “wide 
powers to construct and re-develop, to clear slums and resettle people and to 
manage new housing estates” (Lim, 1983: 3). The HDB’s first task was to 
“initiate a series of renewal and resettlement programmes beginning with the 
Central Area” (Wong, Yap, 2004: 15). This endeavour was supported by a 
United Nations team led by Abrams, Kobe and Koenigsberger (1963), “who 
visited Singapore in 1963 and recommended a comprehensive urban renewal 
programme” (Wong, Yap, 2004: 15). 
 
Unlike the examples of other countries discussed previously, Singapore 
Government took on the sole role and responsibility to provide low-cost public 
housing (Yeh, 1975: 45; Yuen, 2007).  From 1960 to 1970, the HDB built 
118,000 units of public flats to house the poor who had lived in congested 
shophouses in the city centre (Ching, Tyabji, 1991). To fulfil the variety of 
housing needs, the government allowed 40,000 units to be built by the private 
sector for the middle to upper income citizens (Drakakis-Smith, Yeung, 
1977:5).  By 1970s, the Government expanded the housing program to include 
the rest of the citizens of the new nation. By 1975, 51 percent or 1.1 million of 
the Singapore’s residents are housed in public housing (Drakakis-Smith, 
Yeung, 1977: 3).   
 
From the onset, the Government decreed that new housing estates must 
be built as near to the city centre as possible to reduce to cost of time and 
22 
 
expenses due to commute. The first housing estates were built within a five-
mile radius from the city (Quah, 1975: 5). In each estate, HDB adopted a 
neighbourhood principle from England to local conditions by ensuring a higher 
population density (Quah, 1975: 7; Liu, 1975a: 152; Yeung, Yeh, 1975) and 
preserving the “Asian character of the communal way of living while providing 
the essential and modern amenities which are lacking in their old slum areas” 
(Teh, 1969). Each neighbourhood is provided with “schools, shopping centres 
and other communal facilities such as clinics, community centres and places of 
worship” (Quah, 1975: 7). Several neighbourhoods were clustered into towns 
with their own post office, banks, department stores and theatres. For a detailed 
look at the concept of the early neighbourhoods and towns in the 1960s, refer 
to HDB’s First Decade in Public Housing 1960-69 (1970) and Liu’s “Design 
for Better Conditions” (1975: 152-159). 
 
The Government kept the prices of the houses affordable through 
various means. The key ones include subsidies to home buyers, full financial 
support to HDB, and the Land Acquisition Act to acquire land at lower value 
(Castells, Goh, Kwok, 1990; Ching and Tyanji, 1991; Phang, 1992: 252; Choe, 
1975: 103). The Government took control of home financing by allowing home 
buyers to use their Central Provident Fund (CPF) savings (Einhart, 1989: 80; 
Phang, 1992: 251; Chua, Ho, 1975:63: Giok, Phua, 2007), a “scheme to 
provide compulsory savings for retirement for employees” (Park, 1998: 283), 
to finance home purchases under the Home Ownership Scheme. Home loans 
from HDB were kept at a low interest rate (Ching, Tyabji, 1991). Also, the 
Government kept rents for low-income families at a cap of 15 percent of family 
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income (Drakakis-Smith, Yeung, 1977:6). Income ceilings were implemented 
to prevent the poor being priced out of the market (Quah, 1975: 16; Einhart, 
1989: 77; Lim, 1983: 10).  
 
The HDB even produced basic building materials to mitigate the effects 
of the increase of cost of building materials (Lim, 1983: 5; Teh, 1975: 16) – a 
factor that impeded the ability of other Asia countries to provide low-cost 
housing to their citizens. Granite plants were established in Mandai and the 
offshore islands as early as 1963 to mine the local quarry of building materials 
(Wong, Yeh, 1985). HDB also practised bulk purchases and stockpiling to keep 
building costs low. Furthermore, HDB increased the “standardisation of design 
and the introduction of pre-fabrication” to major housing contracts to reduce 
costs (Lim, 1983: 8; Liu, 1975a: 124). Consequently, HDB achieved strong 
economics of scale in construction costs (Wong, Wong, 1975: 84). 
 
 As public housing occupancy increased, overall housing conditions also 
improved progressively. Liu (1975: 174) documented the vastly superior 
internal and external densities on a per capital basis of public housing when 
compared the squalid conditions of shophouse dwellings in Chinatown. Yeh 
and Pang (1973: 16, 17) found out that the “average number of rooms per 
household grew from 0.9 to 2.2 and the average number of persons per room 
decreased from 4.8 to 2.5”. These improvements in national housing standards 
were attributed to public housing. Public housing dwellers have stable access to 
electricity, water supply, sanitation, and bathing facilities (Yeh, 1975: 35-36) 
that they had to share with the community in their old dwellings. The design of 
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the flats had been given much emphasis (Liu, 1975: 159-181). Consequently, 
they were found to be highly satisfied with their new homes, as evident in the 
satisfaction surveys conducted by the HDB. These surveys will be discussed in 
the Literature Review section.  
 
 The HDB was committed to the welfare of dwellers of public housing. 
When a survey conducted by HDB in 1968 identified a problem of a long 
commute to work in factories outside of the city, the HDB “allocated between 
10 to 15 percent of the land area within its housing estates for the development 
of… clean, labour intensive industries (such) as electronic, garment and textile 
factories (Quah, 1975: 11). This initiative brought jobs to the towns and 
drastically cut commute time and expenses. In an employment survey 
conducted in 1972, the findings show that this initiative is successful and a 
significant proportion of the workers employed in those factories lived in 
nearby housing estates (Pang, Khoo, 1975). This initiative is executed at the 
same time as the massive Government project to build transport infrastructure 
to connect new housing estates to the city and industrial areas (Lim, 1983: 6). 
Another example of the HDB’s commitment was the consolidation of the 
ownership of hawker’s stalls. Hawkers’ stalls used to be sources of diseases, 
and even gangsterism due to lucrative racketing (Quah, 1975: 12). In response, 
HDB started building hawker centres in every neighbourhood and took 
ownership of all hawker licenses.  
 
 HDB was constantly seeking to improve the lives of public housing 
dwellers. This outlook was epitomised by this declaration by the (then) deputy 
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CEO of HDB Mr Liu Thai Ker: “Public Housing is not just building, but a way 
of life” (Liu, 1973: 29). HDB took on the role of estate management (Tan, 
1975: 185) and has an “excellent record in maintenance of its buildings and 
common areas, such as parks, landscaped gardens and playgrounds” (Lim, 
1983: 8). HDB also upgraded older estates through the “rewiring of old flats, 
better insulation of markets and food centres, additional lifts in existing 
buildings, the installation of anti-crime and automatic rescue devices in lifts”. 
One-room apartments were demolished and better standard housing built in 
their place.  
 
Besides the factors behind Singapore’s success discussed above, Quah’s 
(1975) cited other factors for Singapore’s successful experience. Firstly, 
Singapore has geographical factors in her favour. Singapore benefitted from the 
advantages of her small size “such as greater control and coordination over 
administration, a higher level of governmental responsiveness, and fewer 
communication problems (25). The lack of natural disasters and a favourable 
granite rock formation allowed Singapore to build high-rise flats. Secondly, 
due to Singapore’s phenomenal economic growth, the Government was able to 
finance the ambitious building projects (26). Lastly, Quah cited political 
leadership as a factor that mattered. Without the Government’s commitment to 
the housing projects, the financial and legal support it gave HDB, and the 
political stability that allowed HDB to conduct long-term and effective 
planning and execution, Singapore’s housing experience would have been 
vastly different. Quah mentioned other internal factors like the effective 
organization of HDB, the well-education workforce of HDB, lack of 
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corruption, and dynamic leadership of HDB (34-44).         
 
 It has to be noted that with all the successes, Singapore’s housing 
experience was not all smooth-sailing. There were challenges and negative 
side-effects that HDB had to overcome in the early stages. Due to the rising 
demand of public housing in the early stages of the program, costs of new flats 
soared. There was an instance when a third of the evicted squatters of the 
flood-prone Kallang Basin were unable to afford the allocated public housing. 
Furthermore, a social survey conducted revealed that life in public housing for 
these dwellers caused “considerable economic and social strain” (Einhart, 
1989: 80). Also, there were inefficiencies in planning. Einhart pointed out that 
“despite waiting lists of over 15,000 applicants, every year several hundred 
flats lay vacant due to the lack of planning… some of the new housing estates 
were too far from places of employment and inadequately served by public 
transport” (83). In response, the Government committed emphasis on urban 
planning, getting HDB to work with the planning authorities to ensure 
integration of housing supply with build-up of facilities, transport, services and 
industry. 
 
4.2 Relative Success in Resettling Urban Slum- and Rural Kampong-
Dwellers 
 
 Like many Governments of Asia countries, Singapore embarked on a 
massive resettlement effort. Before 1974 when the functions of slum clearance 
and urban renewal were taken over by the Urban Redevelopment Authority 
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(URA) (Tai, 1988: 2), HDB was the agency conducting this difficult 
undertaking. HDB’s philosophy is that “land assembly would be met with 
strong resistance unless every settlement case is offered alternative 
accommodation (Wong, Yeh, 1985; Teh, 1975). Between 1960 and 1980, 
158,000 clearance cases were activated (Lim, 1983: 7). The clearances, 
undertaken by the HDB, were done “not only for social betterment, but also to 
ensure proper and speedy development of the country… to ensure the country 
can progress and expand according to plan” (HDB, 1970: 59). Before any 
clearance, a detailed census survey would be conducted. This survey 
determined the amount of relocation benefits the households would get (Wong, 
Yeh, 1985). Such a census also served as an advanced warning of a 
resettlement. Thereafter, the resettlers received attractive compensation (Wong, 
Yeh, 1985; Choe, 1975: 105). They were compensated for their possessions, 
down to the number of fruit trees (Teh, 1975: 14). 
 
 Kleevens (1972) noted that the resettlement approach adopted by the 
Singapore Government is “the most comprehensive in Asia, if not the world” 
(57). He tells us: 
 
The families selected for relocation are given notice well in 
advance, at least six months. They are given S$250 disturbance 
allowance and S$50 transport allowance. Famers, usually 
small, are given alternate choices of new land and city dweller 
can choose from alternative low rent flats. The building of new 
housing estates goes in advance of the slum-clearance… whole 
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squatter-communities can be rehouse ‘in toto”… (where) even 
the shops moved over at the same time. Together with the 
provision of other basic facilities and amenities this scheme is 
successful in bringing about minimal inconveniences to the 
affected families. (58)” 
  
Einhart (1989: 86) recorded how Singapore worked around the complicated 
undertaking of acquiring land meant for redevelopment:  
 
 “Compulsory land acquisition was an important prerequisite 
for urban renewal, but in order to ‘free the land for 
development projects’ the people had to be moved as well. A 
number of financial incentives were introduced to induce 
former landlords and tenants of inner city areas, as well as 
squatters, to move out of their premises. People affected by 
clearance schemes are normally rehoused in HDB flats under 
special arrangements. Squatters and farmers are given a 
modest monetary compensation. Businessmen are also given 
compensation and additional incentives to open a new business 
in a housing estate”. 
 
While there was no major resistance recorded in Singapore’s housing 
and resettlement experience, it was not entirely free of resistance. Einhart 
recorded that “organized resistance to resettlement occurred only in the early 
years of the program” (87). In 1963, the Rural Dwellers Association organized 
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resistance to the commencement of earthworks in the Kallang Basin and Toa 
Payoh sites. Large crowds of squatters blocked the paths of bulldozers. HDB 
Officers “appeased the crowd by paying generous compensation for the 
squatters’ vegetable gardens”. For a detailed account of the event, see Gamer’s 
(1972: 66-88) The Politics of Urban Development in Singapore - one of the 
very few books that detailed the organization of any resistance to relocation in 
Singapore. Soon after, the Government deregistered the association. It learnt 
from this lesson by enacting attractive compensation schemes for subsequent 
resettlement efforts.  
 
Consequently, organized resistance became rare. But it did not 
completely disappear. In 1983, during the eviction of 30 people from their 
Tanjong Pagar shophouse, their belongings were “dump(ed)” onto the streets 
by the police (87). With nowhere else to go, the “embittered squatters painted 
slogans – a rare sight in Singapore – across the shutters: We are Singapore 
citizens, not Vietnamese refugees, We implore to the Prime Minister and Where 
can we call home?” No long after, the resistance died down. One by one, the 
evictees found homes and left the resistance. 
 
5. LEARNING FROM SINGAPORE 
 
Due to Singapore’s relative success, developing countries have been 
visiting the nation-state to learn from her experience. This is despite 
Singapore’s unique cultural, historical, political and geographical context. As 
far back as 1967, the Second Afro-Asian Housing Congress in 1967 “called 
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upon all Governments of Afro-Asian countries to intensify their efforts in the 
field of public housing and commended Singapore as worthy of study in the 
field of large-scale public housing” (Quah, 1975: 2). Geiger and Geiger (1973) 
argued that the developmental experience of Singapore is relevant to other 
developing countries, in spite of the fact that Singapore is a city-state, unlike 
many of her larger Asian neighbours. Drakakis-Smith, Yeung (1977:14) stated 
that despite Singapore’s unique situation, Singapore “do offer a wealth of 
experience to other developing Asia cities in land assembly, planning, design, 
housing management, administration and finance, and other spheres of activity 
in large-scale housing development”. Lim (1983: 2) stated that “the Singapore 
experience in Public Housing may be unique in Asia but it provides an 
important case study and example for rapidly urbanising countries”. 
 
Thus, by 1988, states that had sent officials to Singapore to learn from 
her housing experience include Japan, Soviet Union, South Korea, People’s 
Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand 
and Malaysia (Tai, 1988: 96). Danasiri Amarathunga, a Sri Lankan mayor, is 
seeking to learn from the Singapore housing experience. “There are a lot of 
things that you can learn from Singapore. Especially the public housing," he 
said. “If we can go for high-rise flats like Singapore does, that will help the 
community as well as all these people in the city”.12  
 
China has been sending their officials, including municipal leaders, to 
Singapore to study her developmental and housing experience. Between 1992 
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and 1994, over 400 Chinese delegates were sent to Singapore. A Straits Times 
report stated that “Most (delegates) are interested in Singapore's social and 
institutional development, including the success of its public housing 
programme, the Central Provident Fund scheme, the legal system and the 
virtually corruption-free civil service” 13. Masters courses in Nanyang 
University of Singapore (NTU), especially tailored to these delegates, are 
taught in Chinese. One of the students, Professor Lu, stated that “'we learn 
about concepts and ideas to make things work. But there are practical lessons 
too - like why there is no traffic congestion in the city, and how the grassroots 
groups are organised, and about urban planning”. With the support of his 
University in Shenzhen, Prof Lu set up a Centre for Singapore Studies.  
 
In recent times, Vietnam and Myanmar are asking for Singapore’s help 
to develop their housing programs. In April 2012, Singapore’s President, Dr 
Tony Tan visited Vietnam to cement the ties between Singapore’s state-linked 
firms and local developers to build quality housing for Vietnam. In his speech, 
the Vietnamese host of the event stated that “'many countries can learn from 
Singapore's experience” 14. In May 2012, Myanmar’s Minister for construction 
extended an invitation to Singapore firms “keen on developing hotels, serviced 
apartments and even high-end condominiums in the country, as it steps up its 
urban redevelopment”.15 It is also keen to “work with firms that can help it to 
build satellite cities and low-cost housing”. In response, in June 2012, 
Singapore’s Emeritus Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong, led a high-level 
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delegation to Myanmar to meet with President Thein Sein to discuss how 
Singapore can aid the country in her development. A Straits Times report stated 
that “Myanmar wants aid from Singapore to develop its public housing… 
National Development Minister Khaw Boon Wan, who is part of the 
delegation, said Singapore's housing officials 'are trying to put ourselves in 
their shoes' to see what strategy would work best to provide cheap basic 
housing for them”.16 
 
However, not all observers of Singapore’s housing experience felt that 
Singapore’s housing model should be replicated by other countries. In 1989, 
Einhart (1989: 73) stated that:  
 
There is growing fear that such a massive reconstruction of the 
entire fabric is bound to generate uncontrollable social side-
effects… Singapore’s strategy, to come to terms with the 
housing question, will never serve as a model for other Third 
World nations; for the preconditions for large scale public 
housing were more favourable in the city state than anywhere 
else.  
 
 He argued that “no other government will ever be in a position to 
channel the equivalent level of investment into its urban public housing”. The 
economic boom that Singapore experienced gave it the ability to finance such 
projects – a condition which is “non-existence in most other Third World 
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countries” (73). Einhart’s caution should not be taken lightly. As shown in a 
few examples above, a lack of governmental financial support led to many 
failed projects. However, in recent times, many Asian Third World countries 
have rode on the Asia economic growth wave and are experiencing the rate of 
economic growth as experienced by the Asian Tigers like Singapore.  
 
Like the examples above, these rising nations are looking to ease the 
rapid urban growth through providing low-cost housing and clearing the slums 
in their capitals and large cities. In looking for models and lessons learnt, they 
are turning to Singapore. In the next chapter, this paper will lay out the extent 
of literature these countries can refer to for lessons learnt that can be applied in 











1. THE EXTENSIVE LITERATURE ON SINGAPORE’S HOUSING 
EXPERIENCE 
 
The lessons from Singapore's public-housing experience are well-
documented in areas of 1) policy, 2) satisfaction of living conditions and 
environment, 3) home-ownership schemes, 4) ethic-quotas for purposes of 
nation-building, and even 5) housing as political legitimacy, to name a few. The 
discussion of the entire extent of the literature is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, the following sections will discuss the entire extent of the 
relevant literature, leaving out those focusing on themes like public housing as 
social engineering or as political legitimacy. 
 
2. LITERATURE GAP  
 
There is a gap in the literature dealing with the events during the 
resettlement phase. The extensive literature shows that Singapore's slum-
clearance through resettlement to public housing experience was relatively 
smooth because of the low level of resistance to resettlement from urban and 
rural slum-dwellers. But these works do not conclusively explain this low level 
of resistance, and the official point of view of the HDB is over-represented. 
This gap needs to be addressed because the knowledge of the conditions 
needed for low-resistance to resettlement will aid current slum-clearing efforts 
through resettlement to low-cost housing of developing countries. A smooth 
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resettlement effort will allow these countries - especially those currently 
learning from Singapore's experience - to more swiftly resolve contemporary 
urban problems like over-crowding and squalid living conditions. Section 2.1 
below summarises the literature that discusses Singapore’s slum-clearing 
through resettlement experience and presents the possible factors put forth by 
the authors. 
 
2.1 Literature Dealing with Singapore’s Experience with Resettlement 
to Public Housing 
 
Kleevens’s (1972) Housing and Health in a Tropical City: A Selective 
Study in Singapore, 1964-1967 cites several possible causal factors for the low 
resistance to resettlement. He discussed the merits of advance notice to move, 
welfare handouts like disturbance allowance and transport allowance, choices 
of where to relocate to, and the strategy to move entire communities together to 
a new location to prevent uprooting social roots and bonds, and finally, 
provision of basic facilities and amenities (58). The variable of moving entire 
communities was also cited in Drakakis-Smith and Yeung’s (1977) Public 
housing in the city states of Hong Kong and Singapore. Yeh’s (1976) Public 
Housing in Singapore: An Analysis of Programme Implementation cited the 
factor of a combination of able administrative leadership at the middle level 
with the political leadership at the top as an important variable that ensured that 
effective policies were designed and implemented to smother any need for 




Quah’s (1975) Singapore's Experience in Public Housing: Some lessons 
for other new states cited three factors for Singapore’s successful resettlement 
experience. Firstly, he cited the availability of affordable housing as a factor 
that prevented resistance. Secondly, HDB revised its resettlement policy twice 
to ensure that evictees were given attractive compensation rates and benefits. 
Thirdly, the enactment of the Land Acquisition Act was cited as a key factor 
that provided the Government the power “to acquire land for any residential, 
commercial or industrial purposes” (32). The combination of these three factors 
“enabled to HDB to resettle a total of 74,327 families from February 1960 to 
March 1975” without major incidents. These factors were also cited by Einhart 
(1989) in Squatters’ Struggles and Housing Policies in Asia: Experiences from 
Five Countries in Southeast and South Asia. 
 
Hassan’s (1977) Families in Flats: A Study of Low Income Families in 
Public Housing cites several causal factors that allowed Singapore to institute a 
successful housing program. These demographic, socio-economic and cultural 
factors may be influential in ensuring the low resistance to resettlement in 
Singapore. The factors include the absence of rural-urban migration, a 
predominantly urbanized region, capability to channel funds to housing sector 
due to low defence spending, the design of public housing flats being 
“congruent with the prevailing socio-cultural organization of the family 
system”, that the “general orientation of the people towards change” facilitated 
the housing program, the resettlers’ experience of living in high-density 
conditions, and economic factors (10-15). Tai (1988) spoke of a resettler’s 
mentality towards relocation as an “unavoidable” process (79) where, to the 
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Government, it is a necessary and desirable process in the name of national 
development and progress; and to most people, is considered “one of the things 
about which the individual is powerless to challenge the Government” (81). 
 
Wong and Yeh’s (1985) Housing a Nation: 25 Years of Public Housing 
in Singapore, a publication of HDB, detailed the resettlement process from the 
Authority’s point of view. They cited some reasons for what they perceived 
were the factors to prevented resistance. Firstly, the factor that no households 
were forced out of their homes mattered. However, this claim is disputed by the 
records of forced eviction in other literature. Secondly, the authors detailed the 
soft and proactive approach of the HDB officers prior to resettlement. They tell 
us that: 
 
“At the first level, the resettlement staff personally approach 
squatters and try to identify their needs. Most of the problems, 
like the squatter’s choice of locality or their preference to stay 
with their parents or children, can be resolved at the time of 
relocation. The resettlement staff would take pains to go 
through various alternatives with the squatters and provide 
them with the best alternatives possible. At the second but 
higher level, problems of shortages of amenities in the housing 
estates and improvement of resettlement benefits are brought 
to the attention of HDB’s management (321)”. 
 
This factor is unique in the sense that no other literature cited such a 
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possible causal factor to low resistance. As such, this variable will be factored 
into the interviews. Thirdly, they cited the constant revision of resettlement 
compensation and benefits as another key factor. 
 
3. DATA GAP  
 
The literature gap discussed in section 2 exists in large due to the lack 
of research data on pre-resettlement sentiments towards resettlement, and the 
reasons that informed those sentiments. This data gap is significant because 
negative perceptions and attitudes have been shown to be a cause of resistance 
in the many cases discussed in chapter 1. Without plugging this data gap, 
scholars cannot draw inferences to explain the low level of resistance. Thus, 
the search for the conditions necessary for a smooth resettlement program must 
start with an effort to fill this data-gap. Section 3.1 summarises and discusses 
the studies that collected data on Singapore’s experience on resettlement to 
public housing. 
 
3.1 Studies that collected data on Singapore’s Experience with 
Resettlement to Public Housing 
 
A review of the existing studies on Singapore’s resettlement and public 
housing experience reveals that they all focused on either the planning process 
of resettlement and public housing programs, the current perceptions and 
attitudes of tenants already residing in HDB flats or in their rural dwellings, the 
problems faced by low-income families in public housing, or the impact on 
public housing on social norms and patterns. One of the earliest surveys 
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conducted by the HDB was the HDB Sample Household Survey of 1968, and 
the findings were published in a research monograph (Yeh, HDB, 1972). The 
purpose of the study was to find out “the socio-economic characteristics of 
HDB flat tenants and the degree of their satisfaction with respect to a number 
of physical, social and economic conditions” (Hassan, 1972: 3). The study 
measured, amongst others, the contrast of present conditions with the past (4), 
and the living conditions of resettled household relative to the past. The study 
revealed “substantial improvements in living standards” for HDB tenants 
(196).  
 
The tenants indicated significant improvement in living conditions like 
“travelling time to work and primary school, market facilities, household 
expenditure, health of household members, environment for bringing up 
children, amount of noise and cleanliness of neighbourhood” (197). Nearly 70 
percent of households “express the view that life has become somewhat better 
if not very much better”. Of particular significance were the findings for 
resettlers. A majority of them found that their new living environment accorded 
“an improvement in public safety, health of household members and 
cleanliness of neighbourhood” (Ibid). 58 percent affirmed that living conditions 
and life in general improved for the better in their new housing. 
 
However, while such large scale surveys conducted by HDB covered 
much ground in ascertaining the level of satisfaction towards public housing, 
there were no attempts to measure the sentiments of resettlers prior to 
resettlement and the reasons for their lack of resistance to resettlement. 
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Perhaps, due to the objectives and scope of such large scale quantitative 
surveys, sentiments of resettlers prior to relocation were not included, or even 
not measurable. What about smaller scale qualitative surveys by academics 
outside of the HDB? 
 
Hassan (1977: 21) explained the differences between the large scale 
HDB surveys with the smaller case studies conducted by he and his peers: “the 
data from (these) HDB social surveys are useful for a general overview of the 
social consequences of rehousing in the new environment, but these data are of 
limited utility in understanding the actual dynamics of rehousing and its 
consequences”. He argued that small-scale case studies were more suitable to 
understand such dynamics. In this respect, studies like the ones by Buchanan 
(1972), Gamer (1972), and Spiro (1976) provided more useful insights. 
Through a case study of 36 low income ex-squatter households compared with 
existing squatter households, Buchanan found that for the resettled households, 
in contrary to HDB’s findings, resettlement “adversely affected work 
opportunities and income and did not lead to any visible improvement in living 
conditions”.   
 
Due to a lack of larger scale case studies to validate the findings of 
HDB surveys, Hassan (1977) conducted a case study survey of 414 households 
(28) in the Bukit Merah Housing Estate. The objectives were to ascertain the 
“social, economic, and social-psychological effects of relocation in public 
housing on low income families” (25). While Hassan’s study provided much 
insight, like Buchanan’s (1972), Gamer’s (1972), and Spiro’s (1976), it too did 
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not have a focus on pre-resettlement data-collection. However, Hassan’s record 
and presentation of five case studies in detail gave this study a glimpse of the 
potential of in-depth, qualitative case studies focusing on pre-resettlement 
sentiments based on anecdotal evidence. The structured interview by Hassan 
uncovered the rich backstory of the occupants of public housing, many of 
whom were resettlers. These stories reveal some potential causal factors to the 
low resistance to relocation in Singapore. They include a family that 
volunteered to be resettled to Bukit Merah to escape from squalid Chinatown 
shophouses, and another that volunteered to move from zinc-roofed houses to 
public housing to improve their living circumstances. However, as the 
interviews were not geared towards measuring pre- resettlement sentiments, the 
stories can only remain what they were meant to be – just backstories.  
 
Other studies that either based their analysis on the HDB surveys or 
conducted similar studies like Hassan’s did not yield the insights needed to 
answer the topic question to this study. Weldon, Western, and Tan’s (1973) 
Housing and Satisfaction with Environment in Singapore is a study to 
“evaluate the impact of Singapore Government’s housing policy on people’s 
satisfaction with their urban environment of which housing is an integral part” 
(2). Their work was based on the data collected over two surveys: the HDB 
Tenant Survey conducted in 1968 and the Central Area Survey (CAS). The 
findings were generally positive. However, this study, like the other HDB 
surveys, focused on tenant’s sentiments on their environment after they moved 
in. There were no indications of any sentiments prior to their resettlement. Tai 
and Chen (1977) conducted a study of 250 respondents to compare the “life-
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styles, living environments and the attitudes and perceptions of the 
environment among children and young people living in HDB areas and in 
kampong and rural areas” (7). Their findings reveal that the social spirit in the 
rural areas is far more established than in the housing estates. However, this 
shortcoming was mitigated by the social and recreational facilities, and public 
amenities like commercial, community and transport services (22).  
 
Chang (1975) conducted a study in neighbourliness which compared 
the Woodlands community in their pre- and post- resettlement situation. Yeung 
and Yeh (1975a) conducted another study on the same community, comparing 
the lifestyles of resettlers pre- and post-resettlement. The findings show that, 
post resettlement, the resettlers shifted to a lifestyle that is based more than a 
small group of family, neighbours or relatives, as compared to the lifestyle 
revolving around a larger group of their community pre-resettlement. While 
both studies did not yield insights into pre-resettlement sentiments, it will be 
interesting to note if HDB’s efforts to resettle entire communities is a factor 
that influenced low resistance. 
 
Like Hassan’s presentation of case studies in his publication, Tai’s 
(1988) study of the social and political implications of public housing 
presented five case studies in detail. These cases, while not focused on pre- 
resettlement sentiments, did provide another glimpse into the possible factors 
of low resistance to resettlement. For example, an Indian family cited that they 
volunteered to resettle to public housing as they believed it provided them 
access to a more comfortable life, with “more electrical appliances” (209). In 
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another, a Malay father saved money to be able to relocate to a HDB flat to 
escape the overcrowding conditions in the old dwellings where ten families 
shared a house (222). Like the Malay father, another Chinese family 
volunteered to resettle to public housing so as to have a larger space to bring up 
their new-born daughter (232). 
 
In 1985, Wong and Yeh published a report that detailed the findings of a 
study of the impact of resettlement. This is one of the last major studies into 
this topic. The data was drawn from comprehensive tenant surveys conducted 
in 1968, 1973, 1976 and 1980. While the study was an in-depth longitudinal 
study of a resettled village, the authors were clear to state that their analysis 
“only pertains to an evaluation of the impact after relocation” (321). The 
findings confirmed several themes in the existing literature like the 
improvement of conditions in public housing over the rural dwellings, the fact 
that most resettlers were satisfied with their new environment, and a disruption 
in community spirit due to the design of the estates. 
 
4. POSSIBLE CAUSAL VARIABLES EXTRACTED FROM 
EXISTING LITERATURE 
 
Due to the lack of studies into pre-resettlement sentiments, we do not 
have any conclusive and substantiated explanations to the low resistance to 
resettlement in Singapore’s housing experience. However, as discussed in 
section 2.1, the existing literature did surface several possible causal factors. 
These variables, summarised below, will be factored into the interview 
questions for this study (refer to Section 4.2 and 4.4 of Chapter 3; refer to 
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Annex A of Chapter 3 for a sample of the interview structure). 
 
 This study organizes the range of possible causal variables into 11 
themes so that they can be factored effectively into the interview questions. We 
first look at the themes that emerged from the literature on Singapore’s 
experience. The first three themes involves the mechanisms that empowers the 
authorities to be able to conduct resettlement without the hindrance of no 
alternative of housing, or the hindrance of legal protest channels as seen in 
India’s experience, or the hindrance of differing objectives between the 
Government’s and the private developers’ as seen in Malaysia’s and South 
Korea’s cases. Here are the first three themes: 
 
1) Effective supporting policies – the enactment of the 
Land Acquisition Act was cited as a key factor that provided 
the Government the power “to acquire land for any residential, 
commercial or industrial purposes” (Quah, 1975; Einhart, 
1989). 
 
2) Political factors – firstly, a resettler’s mentality 
towards resettlement as an “unavoidable” process causes the 
belief that the “individual is powerless to challenge the 
Government” (Tai, 1988); secondly, the economic prowess of 
the state enabled the sustainment of the housing and 
resettlement effort (Hassan, 1977); thirdly, a combination of 
able administrative leadership at the middle level with the 
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political leadership at the top ensured that effective policies 
were designed and implemented to smother any need for 
resisting resettlement (Yeh, 1976). 
 
3) Availability of Alternative Housing (Quah, 1975; 
Einhart, 1989). 
 
The second group of themes involves unique contextual circumstances: 
 
4) Geographical factors – like the absence of rural-urban 
migration (Hassan, 1977), a predominantly urbanized region 
(Ibid), and capability to channel funds to housing sector due to 
low defence spending (Ibid). 
 
5) Cultural and Social factors - that the “general 
orientation of the people towards change” facilitated the 
housing program (Hassan, 1977), and that the resettlers’ had 
experience of living in high-density conditions (Ibid). 
 
 The third group of themes directly affects the resettlement experience 
of the evictees on a personal level. They are  
 
6) The measured approach to eviction - this approach 
includes an advanced notice to move (Kleevens, 1972), choices 
of location of resettlement (Ibid), the strategy to move entire 
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communities together to a new location to prevent uprooting 
social roots and bonds (Kleevens, 1972; Drakakis-Smith, 
Yeung, 1977), that no households were forced out of their 
homes (Wong, Yeh, 1985), and the soft and proactive approach 
of the HDB officers (Ibid).  
 
7) Fair Compensation – like welfare handouts including 
disturbance allowance and transport allowance (Kleevens, 
1972), and the attractive compensation rates and benefits 
(Quah, 1975; Einhart, 1989; Wong, Yeh, 1985). 
 
8) Better living environment at public housing – with 
the provision of basic facilities and amenities (Kleevens, 
1972), the design of public housing flats being “congruent with 
the prevailing socio-cultural organization of the family system” 
(Hassan, 1977), improvement from their old living 
circumstances (Ibid) where they had to live in over-crowded 
conditions (Tai, 1988), and that public housing gave them an 
access to a more comfortable life (Ibid). 
 
This study will also draw on relevant causal factors in the literature of 
other countries’ housing experience to augment the list of factors from the 
Singapore experience. Mobrand’s (2008) Struggles over Unlicensed Housing 
in Seoul, 1960-80 cited the causes of the failure of the South Korea 
Government in the efforts of slum-clearing through providing low-cost 
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housing. Despite the strong coercive capability of the Government, resistance 
from evictees were prevalent. The factors that mattered in the cases outside 
Singapore were: 
 
9) Location of the new housing - was a driving factor 
behind slum-dwellers abandoning those dwellings and relocate 
back to city slums. Location mattered because housing in the 
far-flung areas at the periphery of the city impeded access to 
jobs. This factor is echoed by Smart (2006), and Fung (1978).  
 
10) The affordability of the new housing – the 
unaffordability in South Korea’s case caused evictees to 
resettle back to the slums en-mass. This factor of affordability 
is echoed in other works that studies the unsuccessful housing 
resettlement efforts of other countries (Khor, 1989; Einhart, 
1989.)  
 
11) Absence of Corruption - the availability to bride their 
way out of resettlement undermined the government’s 
relocation efforts. This factor is also cited by Einhart (1989) in 
his study of Philippines.  
 
A theme that is similar to the Singapore’s experience is the quality of 
the new housing. The lack of basic amenities in Kwangju was a major factor 
that drove evictees back to the slums in Seoul. This factor is echoed by Baken 
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(2003), and Einhart (1989). Baken’s (2003) Plotting, Squatting, Public Purpose 
and Politics: Land Market Development, Low Income Housing and Public 
Intervention in India adds voice to the Political factor when he cites the 
availability to partner local politicians to enable the organization of resistance 
as a key factor that caused resistance in India. Einhart (1989) cited this factor 
too in his study of Philippines. 
 
With the extent of literature on Singapore’s slum-clearance and 
resettlement to public housing experience reviewed, in addition to the listing of 
the possible causal factors proposed by the authors, the paper will next present 
the design of the study created to respond to the literature gap and the empirical 










The objective of this study was to investigate the causal mechanism that 
allowed the multitude of causal variables cited in existing literature to 
positively influence the outcome of a low resistance to resettlement in 
Singapore between 1965 and 1985. This chapter presents a hypothesis that 
guided the investigation, the theory that informed the hypothesis, and the 
design of the study. 
  
1. OPERATIONALIZING THE CAUSAL CHAIN 
 
To arrive at a hypothesis, the key junctures and concepts in the causal 
chain were first operationalized. These junctures include the causal factors, the 
outcomes of low resistance, and the issue of preferences. 
 
1.1 Point A: The Causal Variables 
 
As reviewed in the literature, the eleven themes of causal variables 
cited are 1) effective supporting policies, 2) strong political support, 3) 
availability of 4) quality and 5) affordable housing 6) at a good location, 7) 
absence of corruption, 8) fair compensation, 9) a measured approach to 
eviction, 10) social and cultural factors, and 11) geographical factors. While the 
totality of these factors is comprehensive, any fieldwork that tries to ascertain 
the causal weight and trajectory of eleven factors will be cumbersome and 
50 
 
inefficient. In response, these eleven factors will be grouped in three 
categories.  
 
The first category involves the endowment factors that Singapore had. 
They include the social, cultural and geographical factors. An investigation into 
this category of factors will involve seeking the respondents’ views on how 
their cultural backgrounds, social interactions and geographical circumstances 
affect how they perceive resettlement. Cultural factors that may influence 
outcomes of low resistance includes a people that had kept traditions from their 
ancestral homelands alive, that possessed a hardiness stemming from a 
generations of rural living, or values that bound communities to higher 
authorities.  
 
The second category involves the policy-level factors that were in place 
between 1965 and 1985 in Singapore. They include strong political support to 
resettlement programs that informed the will to allocate the spectrum of 
coercive resources available to the Government to ensure the programs go as 
planned, effective resettlement policies that were effectively enforced, an 
absence of corruption that might create a trust in the political leadership and 
the bureaucracy, an accessibility to affordable housing, and a policy of ensuring 
the post-resettlement housing are in good locations that provides access to jobs 
and amenities. An investigation into this category of factors will involve 
seeking the respondents’ views on how their perceptions and decisions are 




The third category involves the factors that affect the resettlers on a 
more personal level. They include a measured approach to eviction, fair 
compensation for evictees, and a quality alternate living environment. An 
investigation into this category of factors will involve seeking the respondents’ 
views on how far these factors go in informing their responses to resettlement. 
For example, more affluent and self-sufficient families might appreciate the 
friendly and personal approach to eviction, while others that worry day-to-day 
about survival might be concerned more with monetary compensation. 
 
1.2 Point B: The Outcome of Responses to Resettlement 
 
In Singapore’s experience, there are two categories of resettlers: 
voluntary resettlers and evictees. Voluntary resettlers are deemed to have 
chosen resettlement because they preferred the new dwellings in public 
housing. For evictees, they are deemed to have chosen not to resist either 
because they have come to prefer public housing too, or that they prefer not to 
get into trouble that comes with resistance. These preferences are the 
conditions for low-resistance. The responses from each category of resettlers 
are essential to the investigation in order to ascertain the causal mechanisms in 
the causal chain that affects all resettlers. 
 
1.3 From Point A to Point B 
 
 How did factors in point A affect the outcomes of point B? This was the 
focus of the investigation. Current literature contains no discourse that charts or 
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analyses how the eleven factors, in totality, influenced the outcomes of low 
resistance. The following sections present how a hypothesis was derived to 
guide the investigation. 
 
2. ARRIVING AT A HYPOTHESIS 
 
 As shown above, preferences were key conditions that affected the level 
of resistance. Preference is a complex concept that requires some discussion 
here. This study adopts this operationalization of the concept of preference: 
Preferences are 1) based on our perceptions of objects or issues which make up 
our choices, and 2) our perception is formed when we rationalise those object 
or issue against our values. 3) Our values are in turn shaped by our beliefs. 










Diagram 3.1: How preferences are derived 
 
Preferences 











For example, a person who believes that nature is fragile and thus 
responding to climate change is important will hold the values of sustainability, 
treading lightly on nature, and collective action. Thus, when he rationalises his 
perception that public transport is “greener”, more sustainable, and more 
socially responsible against his values, he will prefer to take public transport 
instead of buying a car. On the other hand, a person who believes nature is 
resilient will have values that place personal needs over the need for collective 
action on climate change. Thus, when he rationalises his perception that a car 
suits his personal needs of convenience and freedom of movement against what 
his values, he will prefer to buy a car instead. 
 
As beliefs vary widely, values will vary widely too. Consequently, the 
finite number of preferences may be a result of a seemingly infinite 
combination of perceptions being rationalised against values. This makes a 
study into how eleven variables influence preferences exceedingly complex. To 
overcome this issue, a question was posed: is it possible to discern a limited 
number of sets of preferences bounded by similar values and beliefs? In 
response, this study turned to an existing theory that provided a “yes” answer.  
 
2.1 The Theory of Plural Rationality (Cultural Theory) 
 
 The Theory of Plural Rationality (Thompson, 2008), or Cultural Theory 
in short, is based on Mary Douglas’s Grid-Group Typology (2003: 8) which she 
used to argue that most cultures (with distinct values and belief systems) can be 
captured on the basis of two discrete criteria: Grid and Group. Building on her 
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typology, Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990) operationalized the typology 
into Cultural Theory, with a normative principle which will be utilized by this 
study. Using the grid-group framework of this theory, one can discern four 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive categories of preferences. These 
categories are separated by their exclusive patterns of perceptions being 
rationalised against values shaped by beliefs. The utility of this theory is two-
fold. Firstly, by framing the multitude of preferences into four categories, it 
allows the study to realistically investigate how the cited causal variables 
influenced preferences. Secondly, the normative principle of this theory 
provides a hypothesis for this study. 
 
2.2 Framing Preferences 
 
Cultural Theory posits that the variation in preferences can be captured 
in four categories, or “ways of life” - Hierarchical, Individualistic, Egalitarian, 
and Fatalistic. Each way of life is categorised by their subscription to the 
criteria of Grid and Group. Grid is characterized by the extent roles and rules 
influence a culture. For example, a highly rigid organization like the Armed 
Forces will be related as high-Grid. On the other hand, a loose and liberal 
organization like informal clubs will be related as low-Grid. Group is 
characterized by the extent group-orientation influence a culture. Football 





Firstly, a culture that embodies the characteristics of high-Grid and 
high-Group tend to have rigid hierarchies, hence the Hierarchical way of life. 
Bodies like the bureaucracy, governmental organizations and agencies, schools, 
and village committee largely subscribes to and operates in the hierarchical 
way of life. Secondly, a culture that embodies the characteristics of low-Grid 
but high-Group tends to be Egalitarian. Bodies like a village community, 
neighbourhood watch, associations of street hawkers, welfare and non-profit 
organizations, and workers’ unions subscribes to and operates in the egalitarian 
way of life. 
 
Thirdly, a culture that embodies the characteristics of low-Grid and 
low-Group tends to be Individualistic. Entrepreneurs, free-market proponents 
and politicians are examples of Individualists. Lastly, a culture that embodies 
the characteristics of high-Grid and low-Group tends to be Fatalistic. These are 
people who believe themselves to be both undermined by rules and authority 
and lack a relationship with groups. They may be individuals who go about 
their lives in resignation to their circumstances, and not willing to join 





Diagram 3.2: The Grid-Group Typology 
 
 Each way of way will have their distinct preferences based on 
perceptions rationalized against values that are shaped by beliefs. Therefore, 
preferences within a way of life will largely be consistent. Drawing on the 
findings from the body of work on Cultural Theory (Douglas, 1987; 
Thompson, Ellis, Wildavsky, 1990; Thompson, Grendstad, Selle, 1999; 
Verweij, et al, 2006), Diagram 3.3 presents the shared beliefs and values of 
members in each way of life. The diagram also describes the strengths and 
weaknesses of any approach to social and policy issues organized according to 










● Beliefs shaped by a world-view 
that nature is fragile, intricately 
interconnected and ephemeral, 
and man is essentially caring 
(until corrupted by coercive 
institutions such as markets and 
hierarchies). 
 
● Values: Equality, Consensus 
Accessibility, Sustainability. 
 
● Strengths: Strong in generating 
debates and consensus. 
 
● Weakness: Inefficiency arises 





● Beliefs shaped by a worldview 
that nature is stable until pushed 
beyond discoverable limits, and 
man is malleable: deeply flawed 
but redeemable by firm, long 
lasting and trustworthy 
institutions. 
 
● Values: Order, Discipline, 
Expertise and Regulation. 
 
● Strengths: Strong in decision-
making and rule-enforcement. 
 
● Weakness: Over-reliance in 




● Beliefs shaped by a worldview 
that nature is benign and 
resilient – able to recover from 
any exploitation – and man as 
inherently self-seeking and 
atomistic. 
 
● Values: Liberty, Market 
Freedom, Right to Choose, 
Competition. 
 
● Strengths: Problem solving 
through innovation. 
 
● Weakness: Over-reliance on 




● Beliefs shaped by a worldview 
that there is neither rhyme nor 
reason in nature, and suppose that 
man is fickle and untrustworthy. 
Fairness is not to be found in this 
life, and there is no possibility of 
effecting change for the better. 
 
● Does not participate socially. 
 
● Surrendered to circumstances 
imposed by rules and norms; 
 
● and by randomness of life. 
 
Diagram 3.3: The beliefs, values, strengths and weaknesses of each way of life 
 
 A key concept of Cultural Theory is that each way of life does not live 
in isolation. Each community, or country, is constituted by several ways of life, 
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and likely all four. Each community or country is differentiated by the level of 
dominance of any ways of life. For example, in a dictatorship with all 
resistance quelled, the society tends to be highly hierarchical and fatalistic, 
with egalitarian organizations distinctly missing. In a socialistic society like the 
French, the dominant way of life will be Egalitarian. In many Asian countries 
where governmental coercive forces are strong, and the people largely focused 
on the pursuit of material development, such cultures tend to have Hierarchical 
dominance and Individualistic social culture. This key concept leads the study 
to a core normative assertion which provides the hypothesis of the study. 
 
2.3 Cultural Theory’s Normative Assertion and Causal Mechanism 
 
Cultural Theory posits that a positive policy outcome to a “wicked 
problem” is a result of a “clumsy” approach. A wicked problem, as opposed to 
a tame problem (complicated but is resolvable through unilinear acts and is 
likely to have occurred before) and a critical problem (a crisis encapsulating 
very little time for decision-making and action), is a problem that is “more 
complex, rather than just complicated – that is, it cannot be removed from its 
environment solved, and returned without affecting the environment. 
Moreover, there is no clear relationship between cause and effect” (Grint, 
2010). 
 
Grint tells us that tame problems like planning a negotiation, training an 
army or railway timetables can be resolved elegantly (single mode and 
internally consistent solutions) through application of past solutions or science. 
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One can deploy standard operating procedures to address the issue. Critical 
problems like medical or military crises, likewise, can be resolved elegantly by 
one taking decisive actions, and providing solutions to the problem. However, 
wicked problems like building a national healthcare system or responding to 
Global Warming cannot be resolved elegantly. For example, providing more 
benefits to the elderly will impose a heavier strain on the younger tax-payers. 
What about other needy groups like the gravely ill or low-income earners? “We 
cannot provide everything for everybody”, Grint tells us about complex 
problems, “at some point we need to make a political decision about who gets 
what and on what criteria”. The key difference is that wicked problems are 
subjective when compared to objective tame and critical problems. 
 
If wicked problems, often deeply complex and affects a large segment 
of society, are treated through a single institutional framework, they are almost 
certain “bound to fail”. Looking through the Cultural Theory lenses, wicked 
problems affects several ways of life or cultures, and they “don’t offer 
themselves up to be solved by elegant approaches precisely because these 
problems lie outside and across several different cultures” (Ibid). Furthermore, 
each way of life has an inherent weakness which can only be identified and 
addressed when seen through the lenses of another way of life. 
 
Verweij et al (2006) presented a case against depending only on elegant 
solutions in the issue of Global Warming. They showed that Hierarchical 
policies to address Global Warming dating back to the Kyoto Protocol will be 
untenable without the inclusion of Egalitarian support in terms of advocacy for 
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green and carbon neutral lifestyles, and the Individualistic support where 
innovating and enterprising entrepreneurs push the forefronts of technology to 
create cheaper alternatives to fossil fuels.  
 
Such a policy response firstly harnesses the strengths of all four ways of 
life and uses those strengths to manage the weaknesses of each. Without the 
pitfalls that will trip up a policy, the policy output will be one that members of 
any way of life will find acceptable, and may come to prefer as the lesser of the 
evils of dominance by any other way of life. This leads to a positive policy 
outcome. Such a policy response is deemed a “clumsy solution” (Ibid). And the 
avoidance of pitfalls through the harness of strengths of one way of life to 
mitigate the weakness that characterizes a clumsy approach is the causal 
mechanism Cultural Theory posits to allow a clumsy approach to influence a 
positive policy outcome to a wicked problem. 
 
In our case, resettlement is a wicked problem that affects a large 
segment of society and requires the mobilization of resources on a national 
level. It needs a compromise between the societal actors and the Government. 
As such, several questions must now be posed. Can Cultural Theory’s 
normative assertion of a clumsy solution as the best response to a wicked 
problem explain the influence of the eleven cited causal factors on a positive 
outcome in Singapore’s resettlement experience? Does the totality of eleven 
factors cited constitute a clumsy approach? If it was indeed clumsy, how do we 
reconcile the actions taken in the policy approach with the endowments already 
present, and credit a clumsy approach as the causal mechanism by controlling 
61 
 
for the effects of endowment? How did the strengths of one way of life 
mitigated the weakness of another to prevent policy failure? Before this study 
addressed these questions, a relevant case study was visited. In the next 
section, the study reviews an urban redevelopment case study that shows that a 
clumsy approach to rebuilding war-torn city (Munich) yielded a much more 
positive outcome than one done elegantly (Birmingham). 
 
2.4 A Case for Clumsiness: Comparing Munich and Birmingham 
 
 Urban planning is a wicked problem. Frank Hendriks (1994) tells us 
that “in most town-planning literature, quality of life is connected to the 
existence of variety and multifunctionality in contrast to monotony and 
monofunctionality” (58). In other words, elegant solutions in urban planning do 
not lead to an outcome of a good quality of life. He argues that clumsy 
solutions, or “cultural pluralism”, are a “favourable condition for minimizing 
the regret that results from project blindness and from monofunctionality. To 
lend empirical credibility to his argument, he compared the urban development 
of post-World War II Birmingham and Munich. 
 
 Hendriks cites Birmingham as an example of how negative policy 
outcomes are results of imposing elegant solutions to wicked problems. He 
explains that “the Birmingham case demonstrates what can happen if the 
cultural biases of a dominant policy community goes unchecked and the 
corresponding project blindness goes uncorrected” (Ibid). By contrast, he 
explains that “in the Munich case… establishment policymakers have learned 
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on the job that listening to other points of view is a valuable way of 
compensating for cultural bias and producing a traffic policy that better serves 
the needs and interests of all its citizens” (59).  
 
 In Birmingham’s case, at the end of World War II, the Public Works 
Committee and the city engineer proposed an Inner Ring road around the 
Victorian heart of the city, which involves a great deal of destruction of the city 
centre over 25 years (Ibid). The authorities’ idea of a modern city does not have 
a place for trams, bicycles or trolley buses. They were preoccupied with the 
problem of a growing number of cars, and they were focused on solving this 
problem. The authorities ignored a number of suggestions from planning 
experts, and stuck to their plan to create a showpiece urban highway. This was 
the hallmark of an elegant solution approached from a Hierarchical way of life. 
 
 As the roads began to form and desirable sites in the city centre 
becomes available, developers which maintained good relations with the 
authorities received well-placed sites. This relationship between a small 
handful of private developers and the authorities were described as “outright 
corruption” (61). This collusion between the Hierarchists and Individualists 
were indifferent to slums or beloved landmarks when it comes to 
redevelopment. This collusion also quelled an Egalitarian resistance from 
architects and expert planners who saw no point in resisting. 
 
By 1971, the works were completed. The Inner Ring Road was 
predominantly characterized by “its monofunctionality, its complete dedication 
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to the single function of moving cars around… (and) greater priority was given 
to the needs of traffic than pedestrians” (Ibid). Pedestrian channels were moved 
to a subterranean level, and old street patterns were broken up. It was until the 
1980s did Egalitarian values of “livability, sustainability, and equal access find 
broad acceptance in the policy community” (62). In the 1990s, it was generally 
acknowledged that the Inner Ring Road had “endangered the livability and the 
prosperity of Birmingham” (Ibid). 
 
Munich’s case was a contrast. Post-war Munich was in ruins, and 
presented planners a “unique opportunity for tabula rasa planning” (63). 
However, the planners decided to respect the traditional street patterns. The 
city engineer proposed a plan that found a compromise between “the needs of 
modern society and the traditional ‘spirit and measure’ of Munich” (Ibid). His 
plan was for three ring roads to ease congestion, but protecting the city centre 
from traffic. The authorities created a plan that harnessed the benefits a variety 
of transport options provided.  
 
Munich’s planners approached problems in clumsy manner. For 
example, when it was found that a ring road that cuts through neighbourhoods 
of cultural significance, the authorities listened to the concerns raised by citizen 
initiatives and consulted expert planners and architects to find a solution. From 
this experience, the authorities learned to bring in societal groups, concerned 
citizens, and experts into the decision making process. Forums were created to 




In 1972, when the Olympic Games were held in Munich, the city was 
celebrated for its accessibility, multifunctionality, pedestrian-friendliness, and 
effectiveness of the transport system. Compared to Birmingham, Munich was 
“on the whole not such a visual, psychological, and physical barrier” (65). This 
was attributed to a policy culture where the Hierarchical way of life 
collaborated with the Individualists (the concern citizens and experts) and the 
Egalitarians (the advocacy groups) to create solutions through an approach that 
produces outcomes acceptable to all ways of life. 
 
2.5 A causal mechanism applicable to Singapore's experience? 
 
Hendriks’ case studies in support of Cultural Theory’s normative 
argument about the merits of clumsy solutions in effecting positive policy 
outcomes served as a platform to craft a hypothesis for Singapore’s case. To 
build a hypothesis stemming from this normative argument, the study must first 
determine if Singapore’s experience was a clumsy one. Does Singapore's 
contextual endowments and resettlement to public housing policies, in totality, 
constitute a clumsy approach? Were there blindspots which, because of 
inherent endowments or other factors, did not create pitfalls to policy success 
measured by low-resistance?  
 
2.6 Is Singapore's Approach Clumsy? 
 
To ascertain if Singapore's approach is clumsy, the cited causal 
variables are plotted into the Grid-Group Typology in Diagram 3.4 according 
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to the extent that factor relates to the Grid and Group. Some factors like 
cultural endowments are broken down into more specific variables as they may 






● Moving entire communities to the 
same housing estate 
● Design of flats conducive to the family 
unit. 






Existing Contextual Endowments: 
 
● Political stability and support 
● Financial Prowess due to economic 




● Land Acquisition Act 
● Competent administration set up to 
conduct resettlement 
● Absence of corruption 
● Management of production to increase 
efficiencies and lower costs. 
Individualist 
 
Existing Contextual Endowments: 
 
● Availability of innovative low-cost 
building technology like prefabrication 
● People's general orientation to change  





● Availability of Alternate housing 
● Measured approach to eviction like 
advanced notice to move, 
● choice of resettlement estates, 
● and no households were forcibly 
removed. 
● Fair compensation 
● Quality housing with amenities 
● Alleviation of over-crowding 
conditions and hardship 
● Access to jobs 
● Affordability of housing 
● Allows private developers to cater to 
middle to upper income housing 
Fatalist 
 
Existing Contextual Endowments: 
 









In terms of contextual endowments, Singapore had favourable 
conditions that would have either made the resettlement agreeable as an option 
to members of certain ways of life, or allowed the avoidance of pitfalls to a 
viable resettlement program. Firstly, the Hierarchical conditions of political 
stability brought about by the one-party domination of the Government, the 
strong mandate given by the ruling party, and the financial capacity endowed 
by a rapidly growing, strong and robust economy allow the authorities to 
effectively carry out their resettlement policies. This is in contrast to a few 
Asian countries seen earlier where Government’s funding and political support 
wavers, creating pitfalls where there was no funding or political will to 
complete low-cost housing projects. 
 
Secondly, seeing from the lenses of the Individualistic way of life, it 
was argued that Singaporeans were willing to resettle to high-density housing 
because they were already familiar with such living conditions, and were not 
highly resistance to change due to the rapidly changing urban and rural 
landscape of Singapore. Also, the innovation from the private sector that gave 
rise to prefabrication techniques and technology reduced the costs of building 
low-cost housing significantly. This strength of the Individualistic way of life 
was harnessed effectively by the authorities. Lastly, Singapore geographical 
circumstances played into the Fatalistic way of life. With reference to Scott’s 
(2009) discussion about how geography determines the extent the long arm of 
the authorities can reach, Singapore’s geography allows the authorities access 
into the entirety of the sovereign land, and does not offer citizens much options 
to escape physically from Governmental policies. 
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In terms of implemented policies, Singapore’s approach created 
favourable conditions that also would have either made the resettlement 
agreeable as an option to members of certain ways of life, or allowed the 
avoidance of pitfalls to a viable resettlement program. Firstly, some of 
Singapore’s policies in the resettlement approach were consistent with the 
values and outlook inherent in the Egalitarian way of life. By moving entire 
communities or village into the same cluster of public flats, the “group” was 
protected and preserved. By designing flats that were conducive to the family 
unit, the smallest unit of “group” was preserved, and even celebrated as the 
building blocks of Singaporean society. By upholding a policy of providing 
low-cost housing, Singapore fulfilled the key Egalitarian values of equality and 
accessibility. 
 
Secondly, Singapore’s resettlement policies utilized the strengths of the 
Hierarchical way of life to mitigate the pitfalls that a market-based system 
would have created. By creating the Land Acquisition Act to acquire land at 
affordable value, by setting up and maintaining an educated, competent and 
well paid administration to conduct resettlement, by keeping corruption almost 
non-existent, and by improving production processes to reduce cost, Singapore 
was able to side-step pitfalls that plagued many Asian countries. 
 
Thirdly, Singapore’s approach to resettlement addressed concerns that 
typical Individuals will have when considering their own interests. They 
include the availability, affordability, and quality of resettlement housing, how 
they were treated by resettlement officials, whether they were given advanced 
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notice, fair compensation, availability of amenities, whether the new housing 
will improve their quality of life, access to jobs, and even access to an upgrade 
of housing type. Singapore’s approach made sure that these issues did not 
become cause for resistance. 
 
Lastly, while typically, no policies are targeted at fatalistic concerns due 
to the fatalists’ withdrawal from public participation, there is however one 
strength of the fatalistic way of life which Singapore drew upon – the merits of 
chance and randomness. This strength was operationalized into a policy of 
random and periodic audit checks on the authorities. This notion that anyone in 
the administration might be subjected to a no-notice audit fostered an 
environment where fatalism was harnessed as a means to prevent corruption. 
 
 As shown, Singapore's approach to resettlement was clumsy. With this 
condition fulfilled, the study next considered an important factor in formalizing 
a hypothesis: the issue of preference. The hypothesis must clearly 
operationalize preferences to resettlement or preferences not to resist as an 
outcome of clumsy solutions. Following the line of reasoning of preference 
based on perception, perception rationalized from values, and values based on 
beliefs, the study must ascertain how a clumsy approach, made up by the 
eleven causal factors, created conditions where the resettlement option or 
choice is perceived as consistent with a resettler’s values and beliefs. 
Consequently, resettlement is deemed as a preferred option, thereby leading to 




 The study considered the three categories of resettlers: 1) the volunteers 
who chose resettlement without being evicted, 2) evictees who chose not to 
resist, and 3) evictees who wanted to resist, or had started minor resistance, but 
eventually chose not to resist, or stop resisting, so as to avoid getting in trouble 
with the authorities. Based on these three categories, conditions that influenced 
preference to resettlement are operationalized into: 1) conditions that catered to 
preferences for resettlement for both volunteers and evictees, and 2) conditions 
that deterred the realization of preferences for resistance. Singapore’s 
experience was met with low resistance because of the existence of these two 
conditions. With this, the study could formalize a hypothesis. 
 
2.7 The Hypothesis 
  
 Drawing on the normative assertion of Cultural Theory, the 
operationalization of preferences, the eleven causal factors, and the conditions 
that define low-resistance, the hypothesis was formalized as such: 
 
The eleven factors shaped the outcome of low resistance 
because the totality of factors constituted a clumsy approach 
which avoided the pitfalls to a viable resettlement program. The 
resulting program catered to the multitude of resettler 






The first element of the hypothesis is the premise that the eleven factors 
shaped the outcome of low-resistance. While this premise was drawn from 
current literature, this study will re-establish this causal relationship through an 
ethnographical study into resettlers, addressing a data gap that prevents a 
concrete substantiation of the assertions in existing literature. The methodology 
will be described in the following sections. The second element of the 
hypothesis is the premise that the eleven factors, in totality, constitute a clumsy 
approach. Section 2.6 has shown that Singapore’s approach was a clumsy one, 
with no dependence on a single dominant elegant approach.  
 
The third element of the hypothesis is the premise that Singapore’s 
clumsy approach allows the authorities to avoid the pitfalls to a viable 
resettlement program. This premise is evident when comparing Singapore’s 
experience shown in section 4 of chapter 1 with the pitfalls experienced by 
Asian countries discussed in section 3 of chapter 1. To recall a few factors, 
Singapore’s approach avoided the dominance and agenda of the private sector 
(an Individualistic weakness) but harnessed their innovations (an 
Individualistic strength), ensured political and financial support to the program 
(a Hierarchical strength), and was sensitive the multitude of needs of the 
community of resettlers (an Egalitarian strength). 
 
The fourth element of the hypothesis is the premise that the clumsy 
approach adopted towards resettlement created a program catered to the 
multitude of resettler preferences. This premise is a key component of the study 
that needs to be investigated. The other key component of the study resides in 
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the last element of the hypothesis: that the clumsy approach towards 
resettlement deterred the realization of any preferences to resist. The following 
sections will first discuss what the study will expect to find if the fourth and 
fifth premise of the hypothesis is to be validated. Subsequently, the rest of the 
chapter will discuss the methodology of the study.  
 
2.8 Expectations of the Findings 
 
 If the hypothesis is to be validated, the findings should fulfil the three 
key sets of expectations. Firstly, the findings must show the clear causal link 
between the causal factors and the preference of resettlement or the preference 
not to resist resettlement. Secondly, the findings must show that the conditions 
that informed the preference for resettlement are either contextual endowments 
or policies implemented by the Singapore Government as part of the 
resettlement endeavour. If the findings indicate alternate reasons for the 
preferences for resettlement, they will be determined whether they are an 
endowment or a policy and if it is a factor that was missed out by current 
literature. The factor will then be reviewed against the grid-group framework to 
determine if the factor reinforces the hypothesis. If a factor is dominant, and 
constitutes an elegant approach, the hypothesis will be falsified. 
 
Lastly, the findings must show that the conditions to deterred resistance 
to resettlement are either contextual endowments or policies implemented by 
the Singapore Government as part of the resettlement endeavour. Like the 
second point above, if the findings present factors outside of the list of eleven, 
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they will be reviewed on whether they validate the hypothesis, or falsify it. The 
next section discusses the research design of the study. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The objective of the study conducted was to collect empirical data from 
a small number of respondents in an attempt to establish 1) the causal flow of 
how components of the clumsy resettlement approach influenced the outcome 
of low resistance, 2) the multitude of resettlement preferences were catered to 
by the clumsy approach, 3) any preference of resistance were deterred by 
mechanisms in the clumsy approach. The study was designed as an 
ethnographical survey where small-n in-depth interviews recorded stories that 
charted how the multitude of variables influenced the perspectives of resettlers, 
how perceptions of resettlement led to a preference to resettle, and how 
resistance was quelled.  
 
In December 2012, these in-depth qualitative conversational-interviews 
were held for subjects who were urban shophouse squatters and rural kampong 
slum-dwellers, and were resettled to public-housing between 1965 and 1985. 
The method of research was chosen due to the primary consideration of the 
nature of data that needs to be collected. The data requires a deep level of 
recollection from respondents, is subjective, and responses may vary so widely 
that typical survey questionnaires will be unable to capture. Furthermore, as the 
study required an understanding into the ways of life of the respondent, their 
belief systems, values, social interactions, and living environment were 
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surveyed. This method of research was also chosen for the secondary reason of 
resource constraints of this study. Firstly, as a Master’s Thesis Research 
Project, the study is limited to a single principal researcher. Secondly, due to 
time-budget constraints, the study is unable to cater to a large-scale survey. 
 
3.1 Limitations of Research Design 
 
The first limitation of a research design based on anecdotal evidence is 
the relativity of perceptions. For example, an urban slum-dweller from an 
overcrowded shop-house dwelling might find the prospect of moving to a 
small HDB flat appealing as the flat has bigger space per person ratio. A rural 
kampong dweller from a spacious zinc-roof house may find the same flat too 
small for his / her liking, but still finds it attractive because of the presence of 
amenities like proper sanitation and clean tap-supplied water. However, the 
effect of this limitation is restricted in this study as the resettlement and 
housing program in Singapore affects both urban and rural slum-dweller alike, 
and they were resettled them to similar housing conditions. The authorities 
back then had to deal with this variation in the relativity of perceptions of 
resettlers too.  
 
The second limitation of this study is the accuracy of perceptions. The 
respondents are asked to share their own perceptions of the resettlement 
situation – which might not be factually accurate. For example, the perception 
that a teenager felt that they do not have a choice of where to move to might be 
inaccurate because their parents had withheld information from them. This 
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limitation was mitigated by the interviewer during the interview, where during 
respondents’ elaborations of their sharing, the interviewer can clarify any 
discrepancies between the reasons behind their perceptions and the official 
recorded facts of the resettlement program. That said, the interviews did not 
surface much discrepancies. 
 
As the respondents were asked to share their perception of their 
families’, neighbours’ and communities’ perceptions, the third limitation of this 
study was the representative value of their perceptions. Again, the accuracy 
and representative values of those perceptions may be questionable. To 
mitigate this limitation, the respondents were asked to elaborate as much as 
they can, sharing details and stories that allowed the interviewer to have a 
certain confidence in the credibility of the sharing. Fourthly, there is the 
limitation of memory-loss or replacement. As the events happened decades 
ago, the respondents might have difficulties recalling accurately their 
sentiments and reasons behind those sentiments. Again, to mitigate this 
limitation, , the respondents were asked to elaborate as much as they can, and 
share details and stories of their experience. 
 
Lastly, another limitation of such a research design is the reduction of 
external validity that results from the small-n data collection. To mitigate this, 
each respondent interviewed was asked questions that go beyond their own 
points of view. They were asked to recall examples or stories of the general 
sentiments of their immediate families, neighbours and community members. 
This gave the research a wider access. However, as discussed, this method 
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poses a challenge of how to ensure the credibility of the respondent’s sharing 
of a wider sentiment. To mitigate this, respondents were probed to share deeper 
into the reasons behind the general sentiments. The next section discusses the 
detailed design of the interviews. 
 
3.2 Design of Interviews 
 
 The interview followed a structured questionnaire that is designed to 
ease the respondent into a reflective mode, and channelled the conversation 
from a micro (personal) view to a macro view. The body of the interview was 
focused on their preference for resettlement, for not resisting. The conversation 
about resistance started only after the sentiments towards resettlement were 
collected because questions asked about resistance will be vastly different 
between a community with no resistance and one that had. Refer to Annex A 
for a sample of the interview template form. The template also served as a 
record-keeping system for this study. 
 
3.2.1 Easing into the conversation 
 
 The start of the interview asked the respondent to share certain details 
to ease the respondent into a reflective mode. This start also gave the 
interviewer a sense of the depth of recall the respondent was able to operate at, 
giving the interview a sense of the type of questions useful for probing. The 




a. Year of birth 
b. Year of resettlement 
c. Residence before resettlement 
d. Residence after resettlement 
e. Number of family members, neighbours, or community members 
that respondent can represent 
f. Reason for resettlement 
g. Ethnicity 
 
Typically, these questions were successful in triggering a wealth of 
stories from the respondents. Respondents shared the background, history and 
the environment of their village or shophouses. 
 
3.2.2 Conversation on Personal Sentiments 
 
 The first part of the main body of the conversation focused on the 
personal sentiments of the respondents. This interview section established how 
they felt at the time they were first informed of the imminent resettlement. It is 
important to first establish whether their sentiments were positive or negative, 
and why. If the sentiments are mostly positive, the study can investigate this 
data trend as a possible independent variable. If there are negative sentiments, 
the study can establish that there are cause for resistance, and thus can 
investigate the reasons why these feelings did not manifest into resistance. The 




a. What did you feel towards resettling to public housing? 
b. What word best describe your feelings at that time? 
c. Why do you feel so? 
d. Can you elaborate on your responses?  
 
Question A required respondents to quantify their feelings on a scale of 1 
to 5, 1 being very negative and 5 being very positive. The requirement to 
quantify their feelings lends some quantitative merits to the measurement – 
allowing comparison between the respondents. The rest of the questions were 
qualitative in nature. For questions C and D, the respondents will be invited to 
share and elaborate respectively the reasons behind their sentiments. It is in 
this section of the interview that the interviewer will observe if the respondent 
had touched on any of the possible causal variables that makes up the clumsy 
approach, and will invite the respondent to share their thoughts how significant 
those variables have played a part in their sentiments. 
 
 Next, the respondents were asked about whether their sentiments 
changed during the transition period between the first knowledge of 
resettlement to the physical occupation of the new public housing flat. This 
section is designed to establish the reasons of any change in sentiments – 
reasons that might also be independent variables that prevented resistance. The 




e. Approximately how long was the period between the time you were 
first informed of the resettlement until the day before you moved into the 
new flat? 
f. During this period, did your feelings towards resettlement change from 
what you felt when you were first informed of the resettlement? 
g. If yes, please elaborate on your new feelings and why. 
 
Question E is designed to establish the length of time of the transition - a 
factor that matters as the length of time of transition may affect change in 
sentiments, thereby presenting itself as a possible independent variable. 
 
3.2.3 Conversation on Wider Sentiments 
 
 The next part of the main body of the conversation focused on the 
respondents’ recollection of the wider sentiments towards resettlement of their 
immediate family, neighbours or community. The structure of the interview 
mirrors that of the conversation on personal sentiments. Other than the primary 
difference of personal versus wider sentiments, a key difference between the 
two conversations is that for question A, there were split responses. For 
example, when asked about the sentiments of the village, respondents gave a 
scale of “2” for older folks, and a “4” for younger villagers. Such 






3.2.4 Conversation on the Presence or Absence of Resistance 
 
 The last part of the series of conversations is designed to establish the 
reasons for the lack of resistance even in the presence of negative sentiments 
towards resettlement. The respondents were asked on: 
 
a. If your relatives' / neighbours' or your feelings were ever negative 
during the initial phase and transition phase of resettlement, did they / you 
try to resist against the resettlement? 
b. If yes, please share how did they / you resist and what was the outcome. 
c. If not, what was their / your reason(s) for not resisting?  
d. Can you elaborate on your response? 
 
For questions C and D, the respondents will likewise be invited to share 
and elaborate respectively the reasons behind the sentiments of others. The 
interviewer will observe if the respondent had touched on any of the possible 
causal variables that makes up the clumsy approach, and will invite the 
respondent to share their thoughts how significant those variables have played 




After considering the timeline and geographical locations of relocation, 
coupled with the demographic make-up of Singapore, the study determined 
that a good sample size - that balances the merits of in-depth anecdotal 
80 
 
evidence and the external validity of a larger sample size - is ten respondents. 
The determined sample size also takes into account the time-budget constraints 
of this study. This rest of this section will show the sampling of respondents for 
this study, and explain how a sample size of ten is adequate for the objectives 
of this study.  
 
Firstly, respondents who meet these criteria were shortlisted: 
 
a. Candidate was physically resettled to public housing 
b. Dwelling type prior to relocation : Rural villages or urban 
dwellings 
c. Time period: Candidate must have resettled during between 
1965 to 1985 
 
Secondly, to increase the internal validity of the small-n study, and to 
control for the possible independent factors, shortlisted candidates were 
selected based on the need to establish a diversity and spread of these factors in 
the sample: 
 
d. Geographical location of dwelling prior to resettlement 
e. Location of public housing respondents were resettled to 
f. Year of resettlement 
g. Type of resettlement: Voluntary or involuntary (eviction) 
h. Ethnicity 
i. Year of birth 
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Factors D and E were considered to control for the possible independent 
variable of geographical locations accounting for the low resistance to 
resettlement. The study sought to capture any variation of sentiments between 
rural or urban dwellers, and between the villages scattered throughout 
Singapore. Factor F was considered to control for the possible independent 
variable of time period accounting for the low resistance to resettlement. As 
discussed in the previous chapters, Singapore’s resettlement policies evolved 
over the two decades under study. Thus, this study sought to capture any 
variation of sentiments between respondents who were resettled over different 
time periods.  
 
Factor G was considered to control for the possible independent 
variable of Government coercive powers manifested in the form of forced 
eviction accounting for the low resistance to resettlement. The study sought to 
capture any variation of sentiments between evicted respondents and voluntary 
relocates. Factor H was considered to control for the possible independent 
variable of the variation of ethnicity accounting for the low resistance to 
resettlement. This factor is salient as Singapore is multi-cultural and there are 
vast differences between cultures that will affect perceptions. The study sought 
to capture any variation of sentiments between individuals and communities of 
different cultures. Factor I was considered to control for the possible 
independent variable of the variation of age group. The study sought to capture 




 The following sections present the sampling spread of the small-n 
study. 
 
3.3.1 Year of Birth 
 
 The spread of the year of births of the sample is presented in Graph 3.5 
below. The sample consists of spread of respondents born in the decades of the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s. This sample allows the study to analyse the influence 
of generational biases. For example, if the data shows an even number of 
negative and positive responses, the study will then observe the age of the 
respondents to determine if generational differences influenced the data. On the 
other hand, if the responses are skewed towards one side of the scale, the study 
can state that the responses are consistent throughout the age groups. 
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3.3.2 Year of Resettlement 
 
 The spread of the year of relocation of the sample is presented in Graph 
3.6 below. The sample boundaries of relocation dates are between 1968 and 
1985. This sample distribution represents to a fair extent the timeline of 
Singapore’s relocation experience. This sample spread allows the study to 
analyse the influence of point of resettlement on the timeline. For example, if 
the data shows an even number of negative and positive responses, the study 
will then observe the time of relocation to determine if the time-period 
differences influenced the data. On the other hand, if the responses are skewed 
towards one side of the scale, the study can state that the responses are 
consistent throughout the timeline. 
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3.3.3 Location of Residence Prior to Resettlement, and Dwelling Type 
 
 The spread of the geographical locations of respondents’ dwellings 
prior to resettlement is shown in Map 3.7 below. Of the ten respondents, two 
(no. 3 and 8) lived in urban shophouse dwellings. Also, the sample consists of 
two respondents (no. 3 and 8) who lived in the city area, one respondent (no. 4) 
who lived at the edge of the city, three (no. 1, 2, and 7) who lived in the 
western cluster, two (no. 5 and 10) in the central cluster, and two (no. 6 and 9) 
in the northern-east cluster. Other than the northern and eastern clusters, the 
sample distribution fairly represents the spread of relocates in Singapore 
between 1965 and 1985. It allows the study to control for the variable of 
geographical locations and dwelling type (rural or urban). 
Diagram 3.7: Map
17
 showing Location of Respondents’  
Residences Prior to Resettlement 
                                                 
17
 Map retrieved from Singapore Map attached in Colony of Singapore Annual Report, 1955, 
published by Authority, Government Printing Office, Singapore. 
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 3.3.4 Location of Residence after Resettlement 
 
 The spread of the geographical locations of respondents’ dwellings after 
resettlement is shown in Map 3.8 below. The sample consists of two 
respondents (no. 3 and 8) who moved within the city area, one respondent (no. 
4) who moved within the city fringe area, three (no. 1, 2, and 7) who moved 
within the western cluster, two (no. 5 and 6) who moved into the central 
cluster, and two (no. 9 and 10) who moved into the eastern cluster. While the 
sample does not represent the northern cluster, the sample distribution fairly 




 showing Location of Respondents’  
Residences prior to and after Resettlement 
 
                                                 
18
 Map retrieved from Singapore Map attached in Colony of Singapore Annual Report, 1955, 
published by Authority, Government Printing Office, Singapore. 
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3.3.5 Resettlement status: Voluntary or Involuntary 
 
 The spread of the relocation status (voluntary or involuntary) of the 
sample is presented in Graph 3.9 below. Six of the ten respondents are evictees 
from rural dwellings, and four are voluntary resettlers from urban and rural 
dwellings. Having a close to even number of voluntary and evicted resettlers, 
the study can observe the effects of a forced resettlement, and at the same time, 
observe the reasons why Singaporeans then actually voluntarily moved into 
public housing. These observations are critical to the study as the reasons for 
voluntary resettlement might be similar to the reasons for the lack of resistance 
to resettlement – which is the topic question of this study. 
  
 
Diagram 3.9: Graph showing Relocation 













3.3.6 Number of Family Members, Neighbours, or Community Members  
 
 The number of family members, neighbours or community members 
the respondent can speak for is presented in Graph 3.10 below. Half out of ten 
of the respondents could speak for their immediate families of less than 50 
persons. The rest could speak confidently speak for the hundreds of villagers in 
their community. One respondent declined to speak for anyone else but himself 
as he was not confident of giving accurate data. 
 
 
Diagram 3.10: Graph showing Number of People  




 The spread of the ethnicity of the sample is presented in Graph 3.11 
below. Nine of the eight respondents are Chinese, while one is a Malay. While 
this sample spread does not fully reflect the ethnic composition of the 






Less than 50 Between 50-100 More than 100
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by the fact that most of the respondents who could speak for their villages and 
community are from racially-mixed villages. That said, this study do recognize 
that this racial distribution is the weakest link in the integrity of the sample. 
This gap should be addressed if a further study is conducted. 
 
 
Diagram 3.11: Graph showing Ethnicity of Respondents 
 
3.4 Data Collection 
 
 The data collection effort was conducted in December 2012. A total of 
ten respondents were interviewed. Each interview lasted for one to two hours. 
The interviews were conducted in various locations throughout Singapore, at 
the choosing of the respondents. Typical locations include homes of 
respondents and public eateries. The interviews were conducted by the 
principal researcher. The data collected was rich and insightful. The next 













3.5 Why the Timeline of 1965-1985? 
 
The timeline of 1965 to 1985 is chosen because firstly, as the literature 
discussed above has shown, most of the resettlement efforts were conducted 
between 1960 and 1985. Secondly, between 1960 and 1965, the Government 
was still learning from the resettlement experience and most policies, 
especially the compensation policy, was only stabilised after 1965. In these five 
years, there were still cases of sporadic resistance and a few cases of organized 
resistance. Therefore, as this study is meant to investigate the reasons of low 
resistance, the timeline of study is chosen to start at 1965. Thirdly, 1965 is the 
year of Singapore’s independence. Starting the timeline of study from 1965 
controls for the effects of geopolitical factors that came with Singapore being a 









1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
 This chapter presents the findings from the interviews conducted. The 
first key component of the findings is that the data showed that the eleven 
factors did shaped the outcome of low-resistance: the causal relationships were 
established. Indeed, the respondents’ preferences for resettlement were a direct 
outcome of the factors cited in the existing literature, and constituted the 
clumsy approach. 
 
The second key component of the findings is that the clumsy approach 
adopted towards resettlement did create a program that catered to the multitude 
of resettler preferences. The findings showed that the conditions that informed 
the preference for resettlement are either contextual endowments or policies 
implemented by the Singapore Government as part of the resettlement 
endeavour. 
 
The third key component of the findings is that the clumsy approach 
towards resettlement deterred the realization of any preferences to resist. The 
findings showed that the conditions to deterred resistance to resettlement are 
either contextual endowments or policies implemented by the Singapore 




The findings are summarized in a Grid-Group Framework in Diagram 
4.1. The reasons that informed the preferences for resettlement, or the 
preferences for not resisting are plotted into the framework according to the 
how each reason related to the values and beliefs of each way of life. In other 




● Access to public amenities like 
markets, post offices, playgrounds. 
● Looking forward to having our own 
house. 
● Everyone moving to same place, so 





● I trust the Government to do 
what's best for me. 
● I trust the leadership. So when 
they say we move, we move. 





● Improvement in quality of life 
through a better living environment: 
○ No more mosquitoes 
○ Easier commute to work 
○ Sanitation needs fulfilled 
○ No more laborious chores 
○ Freedom of movement 
○ empowers independence 
○ Better place to study 
○ Privacy 
● I like change and new experience. 
● Looking forward to a new experience 
● Home ownership as a status in life . 
● Good conditions of new flats. 
● Fair compensation 
● Improved Safety. 
● Uncertainties were addressed during 




● I had no choice but to move, so I 
learn to be contended. 
● Everyone is moving. So just go 
along. 
● Resistance was suppressed. 
● The bulldozers will still come in 
the end. So no point resisting. 
● They did no resist because they 
do not want to get into trouble 
with the authorities. 
● or they simply do not wish to act 
on their reluctance. 




Diagram 4.1: Summary of Findings organized in the Grid–Group Framework 
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 The following tables summarize how responses listed above in Grid-
Group Framework are direct outcomes of resettlement policies or contextual 
endowments which, in its totality, constituted a clumsy approach. A notable 
trend in the data is that preferences of resettlement are found in the 
Hierarchical, Individualist, and Egalitarian way of life; whereas the preferences 
of not starting or ceasing any resistance are found in the fatalistic way of life. 
The tables below reveal why. 
 
EGALITARIAN 









Measures / factors 
behind the Reason 
Related Caus-
al Theme in 
Clumsy Ap-
proach 














ties to place amenities 





Yes   
2 
Looking forward 






Deliberate measure by 







Yes   
3 
Everyone mov-
ing to same 
place, so the 
kampong spirit 




Deliberate measure by 
authorities to resettle 
communities in vil-





Yes   
 
Diagram 4.2: Table depicting how respondents’ reasons for preference are 




The respondents cited three reasons for their preference to resettle that 
are consistent with preferences that result when rationalized against Egalitarian 
values and beliefs. Each of these reasons was informed by the basis of equality 
of access, and community, solidarity and group-orientation. Each of these 
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reasons was made possible by deliberate measures designed and implemented 
by the authorities. They are related to the causal theme of effective supporting 













Measures / factors 
behind the Reason 
Related Caus-
al Theme in 
Clumsy Ap-
proach 




I trust the Gov-
ernment to do 











  Yes 
2 
I trust the leader-
ship. So when 
they say we 





























ership, willingness of 
political leaders to 
engage the electorate 
Strong politi-
cal support 
  Yes 
 
Diagram 4.3: Table depicting how respondents’ reasons for preference are 




The respondents also cited three reasons for their preference to resettle 
that are consistent with preferences that result when rationalized against 
Hierarchical values and beliefs. These reasons were informed by the basis of 
merits of trustworthy institutions, expertise, order, discipline and regulation. 
Each of these reasons was made possible by the contextual endowments of 
competent bureaucracy, a willingness to conform, and the characteristics of the 
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political leadership. They are related to the causal theme of strong political 
support, social-cultural factors, and absence of corruption.  
INDIVIDUALIST 









Measures / factors 
behind the Reason 
Related Caus-
al Theme in 
Clumsy Ap-
proach 





quality of life 
through a better 
living environ-
ment: 






Design of housing 
estate prevents mos-
quito breeding, regu-












ties to place housing 










design measures to 
provide for basic sani-









design measures to 
provide for basic ne-
cessities like water 
and electricity 



















Yes   
g 











Yes   
2 
















to a new experi-
ence 
Compulsory eviction, 







Yes   
4 
Home-
ownership as a 











Yes   
5 
Good conditions 
of new flats 
Personal 
Comfort 




















Yes   
7 Improved Safety 
Personal 
Gain 
Policies that mandates 
building design to 














Policies to provide 
handout, publications 
and preview tours to 
provide information 





Yes   
 
 
Diagram 4.4: Table depicting how respondents’ reasons for preference are 
direct outcomes of resettlement policies or contextual endowments in the 
Individualist context 
 
The findings that are consistent with the individualist way of life are the 
most substantial. The factors range from several reasons in terms of 
improvement of quality of life through a better living environment, to hugely 
personal reasons like looking forward to a new experience, to fair 
compensation, adequate safety and having their anxieties addressed through 
information dissemination. Most of the factors relate to values and beliefs 
deemed important in the individualist way of life like personal liberty, right to 
choose, personal needs like comfort and gain, competition and market freedom. 
All of these factors are made possible by deliberate policy designs that are 
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comprehensively executed, and state coercive powers are empowered to 
enforce them. They include housing design, regulations, construction 
standards, home-ownership schemes, environmental maintenance, transport 
planning, urban layout, compensation schemes and fire safety. They relate to 
the causal factors of effective supporting policies, availability of quality and 
affordable housing at a good location, and fair compensation. 
 
FATALIST 









Measures / factors 
behind the Reason 
Related Caus-
al Theme in 
Clumsy Ap-
proach 




I had no choice 
but to move, so I 








Lack of choices alter-







  Yes 
2 
Everyone is 
moving. So just 
go along 




Coercive apparatus of 




  Yes 
4 
The bulldozers 
will still come in 
the end. So no 
point resisting 
  Yes 
5 
They did no 
resist because 
they do not want 
to get into trou-
ble with the au-
thorities 
Coercive apparatus of 
the State deployed to 
deter resistance 
  Yes 
6 
They do not 







  Yes 
7 
They simply do 






Nil Nil     
 
Diagram 4.5: Table depicting how respondents’ reasons for preference are 




The findings that are consistent with the fatalistic way of life revealed 
the reasons why any preference for resistance is deterred or quelled. Generally, 
while there were resettlers who did not prefer resettlement, and some even 
staged some form of minor resistance, there was a reluctance to resist, and any 
resistance eventually were terminated by the resettlers themselves. The reasons 
stemmed from the widely known coercive ability of the state. Resistance were 
terminated as they reached a point where the consequences were deemed too 
severe, or simply not worth the effort.  
 
Also, there are some respondents that felt that they were subverted to a 
larger norm that they were only a small part of, and thus should be become a 
trouble-maker. They surrendered to their circumstances and preferred not to 
resist. Also, those who wanted to resist resettlement had nowhere to relocate to 
that the authorities cannot reach. These factors of strong political support, 
social-cultural norms and geography are endowments that the clumsy 
resettlement approach harnessed to ensure that any preference to resist was 
deterred. The next table summarises how the clumsy resettlement approach 










S/N Cited Causal Factors 
Catered to the preferences for resettlement /  
deterred the preference for resistance of: 




Yes   Yes   
2 Strong political support   Yes   Yes 
3 Availability of housing     Yes   
4 Quality of housing     Yes   
5 Affordability of housing Yes   Yes   
6 Good location of housing     Yes   
7 Absence of corruption   Yes     
8 Fair Compensation     Yes   
9 
Measured approach to evic-
tion 
        
10 Social-cultural factors   Yes   Yes 
11 Geographical factors       Yes 
 
Diagram 4.6: Table depicting how the eleven causal themes, in totality, 
constituted a clumsy approach 
 
The tables above demonstrated that an ethnographical survey of ten 
respondents and their perception of the sentiments of their family, neighbours 
or communities captured the how preferences to resettlement or not to resist 
were a direct outcome of measures and factors that constituted a clumsy 
approach to resettlement. As seen in diagram 4.5, the cited factors in existing 
literature catered to the multitude of preferences of resettlement, and deterred 
preferences to resist. The findings did not however reveal any respondent who 
may find that the measured approach to eviction is a salient factor that 
informed their preference for resettlement or resistance. For the purposes of 
this study, it is sufficient to note that while this factor may be over-rated, it 




In essence, the study had fulfilled its objective of collecting empirical 
data to establish 1) the causal flow of how components of the clumsy 
resettlement approach influenced the outcome of low resistance, 2) the 
multitude of resettlement preferences were catered to by the clumsy approach, 
3) any preference of resistance were deterred by mechanisms in the clumsy 
approach. The implications of these findings will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
The rest of this chapter will present the findings that the tables above drew 
from. 
 
The findings are presented in three parts. Firstly, the findings of the 
sentiments and perceptions of individual respondents towards resettlement are 
presented. It is followed by the findings of the sentiments and perceptions of 
the respondents’ families, neighbours and communities. Lastly, the findings for 
the presence or absence of resistance are presented. Para 1.1 to 1.3 summarises 
the findings of these three parts. 
 
1.1 Summary of Findings for Individual Respondents’ Sentiments and 
Beliefs towards Resettlement 
 
The study found that the sentiments of individual respondents towards 
resettlement were largely positive. This indicates that they largely prefer 
resettlement as opposed to resistance. The key reason for this positivity is their 
perception that public housing is an improvement to their quality of life due to 
the better living environment. Specifically, respondents cite a tremendous 
improvement in hygiene, and a relief of hardship that comes with living in 
previous rural or urban dwellings. The secondary reasons for this positivity 
vary, but the theme of a trust and fear of the government emerged. Lastly, the 
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study found that for some of the respondents, their sentiments do change 
during transition period between their first knowledge of an impending 
resettlement, to the actual occupation of the public housing. This is due to their 
visits to their new dwellings - which reinforced held perceptions and alleviated 
uncertainties that comes with resettlement. 
 
1.2 Summary of Findings for Respondents’ Perceptions of their 
Families’, Neighbours’ and Communities’ Sentiments and Beliefs towards 
Resettlement 
 
Through the sharing of respondents’ perceptions, the study found that 
their families’, neighbours’ and communities’ sentiments towards resettlement 
were similarly largely positive. The key reason for this positivity is likewise 
their perception that public housing is an improvement to their quality of life 
due to the better living environment. On top of the reasons of improvement in 
hygiene and a relief of as shared by individual respondents, new themes 
emerged. They include the parents’ wish of better life for kids, the relief of 
long commute for working adults, and home ownership. The secondary reasons 
for this positivity are similar to the individuals’ theme of a trust and fear of the 
government. Lastly, like the individual respondents, the families’, neighbours’ 
and communities’ sentiments do change during transition period due to their 
visits to their new dwellings which reinforced held perceptions and alleviated 
uncertainties that comes with resettlement. 
 
1.3 Summary of Findings for Resistance (or lack thereof) towards 
Resettlement  
 
 The largely positive sentiments of resettlers would certainly have 
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contributed to the low-resistance towards resettlement. However, the study 
investigates deeper to ascertain whether there were still resistance towards 
resettlement. Respondents shared that there are sporadic cases of resistance, but 
they all fizzled out before the actual eviction. The key reason for the ceasing of 
minor resistance was the populace’s fear and respect for Government authority. 
Thus, it created a perception that resistance is futile, and Government’s 
coercive powers will prevail. 
 
2. FINDINGS FOR INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS 
 
 The respondents were asked to share their personal sentiments and 
reason behind those sentiments, before sharing about their perception of how 
their immediate family, neighbours or community felt. This section presents 
their initial feelings when they learnt about the resettlement, the reasons behind 
those sentiments, whether those sentiments changed during the transition 
phase, and why. 
 
2.1 Initial Feelings towards Imminent Resettlement 
 
 The respondents were asked to quantify, on a scale of 1 (most negative) 
to 5 (most positive), their sentiments towards resettlement. The results are 
presented on Graph 4.6 below. Seven out of ten respondents gave a positive 
response (score = 4); and one gave a most positive response (score =5). Two 
respondents gave a neutral response (score = 3). It can be stated that the 





Diagram 4.7: Graph showing Respondents’ Scale 
of Feelings towards Imminent Resettlement 
 
2.2 Words describing Initial Feelings towards Imminent Resettlement 
 
 The respondents were then asked to choose the most appropriate word 
to describe their sentiments towards resettlement. The results are presented on 
Graph 4.7 below. Three out of ten respondents stated that they are “happy” to 
be resettled. Three others stated that they are “excited”. Two respondents chose 
“indifferent” and “uncertain but hopeful” each.  
 
















Happy Excited Indifferent Uncertain but Hopeful
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describing Feelings towards Imminent Resettlement 
 
2.3 Elaboration of Initial perception towards Imminent Resettlement 
 
 During the in-depth interview, the respondents were asked to elaborate 
on their sentiments when they first came to know about the imminent 
resettlement by sharing the reasons that informed those sentiments. These 
elaborations constitute the bulk of anecdotal evidence this study is collecting. 
The respondents shared several reasons, but were invited to choose their 
primary and secondary reasons. Graph 4.8 presents the primary and secondary 
reasons. Eight out of ten respondents chose “Public housing is an improvement 
to my quality of life due to the better living environment” as their primary 
reason, while one chose “Looking forward to a new experience” and another 
chose “Indifferent as I don’t know what to expect” as their key reason. Next, 
three of the ten respondents chose “I trust the Government to do what’s best for 
me” as their secondary reason, while one chose “I have no choice but to move, 
so I learnt to be contended” and “Looking forward to having our own house” as 





Diagram 4.9: Graph showing Respondents’ Key Reasons for 
Perception towards Imminent Resettlement 
 
 Evidently, the perception that a resettlement to public housing is an 
upgrade in their quality of life due to the improvement in living conditions is 
the key factor that causes the respondents’ positive sentiments. Notably too, is 
that there are several other reasons that informed those sentiments. From their 
trust in the Government, their submission to restricted circumstances, to the 
looking forward to a new experience or a house to call their own, the reasons 
are wide and varied. The respondent who cited “indifferent” as his sentiment 
clarified that while he gave a positive score (score = 4), “indifferent” best 
describes his sentiment as he was relatively young at that time, and his focus 
was on trying to do well for his studies. He was indifferent to the resettlement 
when he first heard about it, but felt more positively than negatively due to the 



































Primary Reason 8 0 0 1 0 1









After choosing their primary and secondary reasons behind their initial 
sentiments towards resettlement, they were invited to elaborate on these 
reasons. Their rich and vivid anecdotal sharing are paraphrased here. The 
respondents who chose the factor of “public housing is an improvement to my 
quality of life due to the better living environment” as their primary factor 
shared that: 
 
1) Public housing had a vast improvement in hygiene, and a 
reduction in commuting time to work. Life in the Kampong 
was tough. There were many chores to do. Chores that we did 
not have to do when we relocate because of the amenities in 
public housing; 
 
2) I looked forward to the reduced traveling time to work. 
Also, I did not have to live with mosquitoes anymore; 
 
3) I looked forward to improved hygiene, privacy, freedom of 
movement, independence, and a better place to study. Our 
shophouse home is not conducive to studying because of noise 
and lack of privacy. Many families lived in the same house, 
and the walls are very thin; 
 
4) For us, having a concrete house, a shelter, a “Rumah Batu”, 
where we have our own water taps and toilet, is a major 
upgrade in our living conditions and thus quality of life. In the 
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new flat, we just “press only, light and water will come out!” 
In our old place, we had to queue up even for toilet; 
 
5) I looked forward to improved hygiene, our personal toilet - 
especially with flushing, a house with tiles (we lived in a 
wooden house with zinc roofing, better amenities like markets. 
When we saw the pristine conditions of SIT flats, it made us 
look forward to our very own flats. They serve as a good 
benchmark; 
 
6) I looked forward to improved hygiene, our personal toilet - 
especially with flushing, and our own taps; 
 
7) We went from a cramped place to a more spacious 
environment. There were a lot of people staying in our attap 
house. 
 
The respondents who chose the factor of “I trust the Government to do 
what’s best for me” as their primary factor shared that: 
 
1) The Government has always done what's best for us. We 
have jobs and means to support ourselves. My parents came 





2) The old-guard was well respected. I trust them to know what 
will improve our lives. So when they say move, we move; 
 
3) Many of us had lived through a hard life. My parents lived 
through WWII under the Japanese. Thus, we do not take 
anything for granted. The old guards of leaders back then could 
speak to us folks on the ground. I remember seeing Lee Kuan 
Yew speaking to us in all languages. I can see their sincerity in 
helping us. So for us, we trust them, and we will do what is 
necessary for the progress of our independent country. 
 
The respondents who chose the factor of “I had no choice but to move, 
so we learn to be contended” as their primary factor shared that: 
 
Everyone is moving. So no choice! 
 
The respondents who chose the factor of “Looking forward to a new 
experience” as their primary factor shared that: 
 
I always like change, like new experiences and new things. So 
moving to HDB is a whole new lifestyle. I am looking forward 
to it. 
 
The respondents who chose the factor of “Looking forward to having 
our own house” as their primary factor shared that: 
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The key factor was really that we have our very own flat. The 
conditions were better (nice flooring, solid and new, own 
toilets, water. My perception of the standard of HDB flat is 
from my parents. I looked forward to the privacy. (We have 7 
members living on one level). 
 
 This elaboration of the top primary factor of improved quality of life 
due to better living conditions pulls up two key themes. Firstly, the matter of 
improved hygiene was well cited. Most respondents, both rural and urban, had 
to live with communal toilets with no flushing and smelled horribly. In those 
days, human waste was collected in a basin below the latrine, and collected by 
professional waste-collectors at night. Lack of clean water was also a key 
hygiene factor. In rural areas, water was retrieved manually from wells or 
communal taps. In urban areas, communal taps run near sewer areas, and 
diseases were spread through usage of such taps. Another hygiene factor was 
the condition of their homes. Most homes were made of wood and metal, 
which rots and rusts respectively, causing a poor environment to dwell in. 
Insects, mould, stale air attacked their senses.  
 
Secondly, life was tough in those days in a rural kampong dwelling or 
in an urban shophouse. Respondents who lived in rural dwellings told stories of 
the need to toll away all day on fetching water on wells, maintaining the crop 
fields, and feeding the livestock. They are constantly in danger of being 
attacked by snakes or bees. Mosquitoes were a constant irritation. Their homes 
leaked and even flooded during rain. On hot days, their homes became giant 
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ovens. For those who commuted to work or school, it takes hours to walk to 
their destination or to a bus-stop served by an unreliable service. For those 
respondents who lived in urban shophouses, they had to contend with vastly 
different, but no easier, living conditions. Overcrowding conditions where 
many families squeezed into small rooms meant that there is absolutely no 
privacy between families. Walls are wooden-plank thin, and usually have a 
huge gap before the ceiling to cater for ventilation. Internal family squabbles 
happened every day, a result of worries over rent, jobs, education, or hygiene. 
Those squabbles made for a poor environment for studying – a main concern 
for one of the respondent. 
 
 The elaboration of the factor of them trusting the Government to do 
what was best for them revealed the social-cultural context that informed this 
trust. As a young nation fresh from a tumultuous 2 decades before 
independence – where the citizens suffered the brutality of the Japanese 
Occupation, the uncertainty after the pull-out of the British from the colony, the 
dangers during the racial riots, the anxiety over how to make this nation 
survive after the pull-out from Malaysia – most adults living in Singapore 
between 1965 and 1985 have seen hard times. This background gave them an 
outlook in life where when they finally saw political leaders that were their 
own people, and fought hard to alleviate their poor circumstances, they 
followed. They do not take peace and prosperity for granted, and thus deeply 
appreciate the improvement in their quality of life. Thus, couple this outlook 
with the perception that public housing was an improvement to their current 
dwellings, they went along willingly.  
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Other elaborations revealed themes like the willingness to submit 
themselves to social norms to “move along”, like the individual preferences for 
new experiences, and like how they are attracted by the notion of home-
ownership. 
 
2.4 Change of Sentiments during Transition Phase of Resettlement 
 
 The respondents were asked to share if their sentiments changed during 
the period between the times they first knew about the imminent resettlement 
and when they physically occupied the new public housing dwelling. Their 
response is presented in Graph 4.9 below. 
 
 
Diagram 4.10: Graph showing Respondents’ Change of Sentiments 
during Transition Phase of Resettlement 
 
 Half of the ten respondents shared that their sentiments changed. Three 
others stated that their sentiments did not change. This question was not 
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month was too short to effect any change. The transition periods recorded 
ranged from six months to two years. 
 
2.5 Elaboration on the Change of Sentiments during Transition Phase 
of Resettlement 
 
 Next, the respondents who shared that their sentiments changed during 
the transition period were asked to share and elaborate on their reasons for the 
change. Their sharing is summarised and presented here. The respondents’ 
elaborations on reasons for change of sentiments during resettlement phase 
included: 
 
1) Happier due to a) visited the new flats. Happy with 
environment. b) Compensation by the Government is 
reasonable. c) Now more certain of new life; 
 
2) I got more excited as the day of move got closer. We saw the 
new place; 
 
3) Not too happy when we saw that the flat was small. 
Everything was smaller. 
 
 Three of the four respondents shared similar reasons for their 
sentiments to become more positive than when they first knew about the 
resettlement. The key reason is that they had preview of their new public 
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housing flat. The preview confirmed their perception of a better living 
environment. This knowledge and confirmation of perception eased any 
remaining concerns arising from the uncertainties of a new environment. Other 
reasons for a change of sentiments include fair compensation for their old 
dwellings, knowing that they will be having their own rooms, or even intrinsic 
motivation arising from the knowledge that reality is drawing closer. The 
respondent whose sentiments changed for the worse was not happy when she 
saw that her new environment was less spacious than her kampong dwelling. 
 
3. FINDINGS FOR RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR 
FAMILIES’, NEIGHBOURS’ AND COMMUNITIES’ SENTIMENTS 
AND BELIEFS TOWARDS RESETTLEMENT 
 
 The respondents were asked to share their perception of the sentiments 
of their family members, neighbours or community members like fellow 
villagers or shophouse dwellers, and the reasons behind those sentiments. This 
section presents their perception of the initial sentiments of their family, 
neighbours or community when they learnt about the relocation, the reasons 
behind those sentiments, whether those sentiments changed during the 
transition phase, and why. As noted in the study design section of this paper, 
this section presents data that are perceptions the respondent held of the general 
sentiments of their family, neighbours or community. Respondents are assessed 
for their confidence in their perception through the encouragement for them to 
share as much details or anecdotal evidence as possible. 
 
 That said, unlike the previous section where the anecdotal evidence 
collected served as an insight into the sentiments of the group of individuals, 
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this section serves to collect a wider data through the perceptions of this group 
of individuals with a purpose to give a glimpse into the potential of a study to 
collect data on a wider scale. The findings presented in this section echoes 
closely to the trends shown in the previous section. In other words, the findings 
show that the collective sentiments of the individual respondents reflect that of 
the wider community, thereby lending external validity to the findings. On the 
other hand, the findings in this section surface new potential independent 
variables, and a consciousness that there is a variation of views between the 
older and younger generation.  
 
3.1 Initial Feelings towards Imminent Resettlement 
 
 The respondents were asked to quantify, on a scale of 1 (most negative) 
to 5 (most positive), their perception of the sentiments of their family members, 
neighbours or community towards resettlement. The results are presented on 
Graph 4.10 below. The respondents choose to represent four groups of people, 
namely 1) parents, 2) Older Folks in their village, 3) younger folks in their 
village, 4) the entire village in general. Two of the respondents chose to 
separate their responses to this question into perceptions for two groups of 






Diagram 4.11: Graph showing Scale of Feelings towards Imminent 
Resettlement 
 
Eight sets of responses indicated a positive (score = 4 and above), one 
set of response indicated a neutral response (score = 3), and three sets of 
responses indicated a negative response (score = 2 and below). It can be stated 
that for the majority of the resettlement experience for the respondents’ family, 
neighbours or community was a positive one. The next section will shed light 
on what are the causes of the negative emotions. 
 
3.2 Words describing Initial Feelings towards Imminent Resettlement 
 
 The respondents were then asked to choose the most appropriate word 
to describe the sentiments of their family, neighbours or community towards 




2 - Negative 3 - Neutral 4 - Positive
5 - Most
Positive
Entire Village 0 0 0 0 1
Parents 0 0 1 4 0
Younger Generation 0 0 0 3 0









Diagram 4.12: Graph showing Words describing 
Feelings towards Imminent Resettlement 
 
Half of the ten sets of responses indicate that the respondents’ family, 
neighbours or community felt “hopeful” when they initially knew they were to 
be resettled. Three other responses indicated the sentiment of “happy”. The last 
four responses indicated “concerned” as the descriptive word of the sentiments. 
 
3.3 Elaboration of Initial perception towards Imminent Resettlement 
 
 The respondents were asked to elaborate on their perception of the 
sentiments of their family members, neighbours or community when they first 
came to know about the imminent resettlement by sharing the reasons that 
informed those sentiments. These elaborations complement the personal 
anecdotal evidence shown earlier. The respondents shared several reasons, but 
were likewise invited to choose their primary and secondary reasons. Graph 
4.12 presents the primary and secondary reasons. Seven out of eleven sets of 
Happy Hopeful Concerned
Entire Village 1 0 0
Parents 2 2 1
Younger Generation 0 3 0







responses indicated “Public housing is an improvement to their quality of life 
due to the better living environment” as their primary reason, while one chose 
“They trust the Government to do what’s best for them”, another chose “They 
had no choice but to move, so everyone learnt to be contended”, and the last 
one chose “They miss the old way of life” as their key reason. For their 
secondary reasons (see Graph 4.13), three responses indicated “They had no 
choice but to move, so everyone learnt to be contended”, one response 
indicated “They trust the Government to do what’s best for them”, and another 
indicated “Looking forward to owning their own house”.  
  
 
Diagram 4.13: Graph showing Respondents’ Perception of their Families’, 





to their quality of












Miss old way of
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Entire Village 1 0 1 0
Parents 4 1 0 0
Younger Generation 2 0 0 0









Diagram 4.14: Graph showing Respondents’ Perception of their Families’, 
Neighbours’ or Communities’ Secondary Reasons for their Sentiments towards 
Imminent Resettlement 
 
Evidently, similar to the findings for the individual respondents, the 
perception that a relocation to public housing is an upgrade in their quality of 
life due to the improvement in living conditions is the key factor that causes the 
respondents’ families’, neighbours’ and community’s positive sentiments. From 
their trust in the Government, their submission to restricted circumstances, to 
the looking forward to a new experience or a house to call their own, but at the 
same time missing their own way of life, the reasons are wide and varied.  
 
After choosing their primary and secondary reasons behind their initial 
sentiments towards resettlement, they were invited to elaborate on their 
perception of why their families, neighbours and community felt generally 
Public housing is
an improvement
to their quality of
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positive towards resettlement. Their rich and vivid anecdotal sharing are 
presented here. The respondents who chose the factor of “Public housing is an 
improvement to my quality of life due to the better living environment” as their 
primary factor shared that: 
 
1) My parents looked forward to the improved quality of life 
due to improved living conditions, especially for the kids. In 
the cramped cubicle housing environment in a shophouse, kids 
cannot study as the frequent quarrels can be heard by all. It is 
disruptive. They also looked forward to the improved safety: 
Shophouse is a fire hazard. Staircases are poorly lit, and only 
one fire exit. Life was tough in the shophouse; 
 
2) The key issue was that they don't have to argue with their 
neighbours over the common water taps. Having their own 
amenities is a big factor; 
 
3) The villagers looked forward to owning their own houses - 
most of them rented their houses in the kampong; 
 
4) My neighbours looked forward to the shorter commute time. 
The Main Road was far. It takes a 15-minute walk just to take a 





5) Safety was a key factor. There is a strong fire hazard in the 
shophouse. Due to the electric wiring, fire can spread fast. 
There was also a gangster issue. The shophouse was eerie due 
to suicides that happened, and there were constantly snakes 
sighting in the house; 
 
6) They were happy because no need to do hard labour like 
farming anymore. We are pig farmers and the stench is 
unbearable. We had to fetch our own water from the well. 
 
The respondents who cited that they “Miss the old way of life” shared 
that: 
 
1) In kampong, they make a small living by planting fruits and 
vegetables to sell. They do not have CPF. HDB life prevents 
them from doing this. This takes away their financial 
independence. So they worry; 
 
2) There are still some sadness: Farmers lost their livelihood, 
and the older generation feels a sense of attachment to the 
land; 
 
3) There is a freedom in the Kampong life. All villagers are 





This segment of the interview gave the study an insight into the 
sentiments and the reason behind those sentiments of the families, neighbours 
and community of the respondents. Other than the two key themes observed in 
the individual responses - of improved hygiene and a relief of hardship of life 
in rural areas – as shared earlier, the elaboration of the top primary factor of 
improved quality of life due to better living conditions reveals three more key 
themes.  
 
Firstly, parents’ wish for a better life for their kids is a major factor the 
move to public housing was desirable. Public housing offers better 
environment for kids to grow up safely, and is more conducive to education. 
Secondly, for working adults, the long commute to work was another factor 
that the availability and convenience of public transport in public housing 
estates alleviated. Thirdly, due to the nature of real estate ownership where 
private landlords controls the affordability of homes, relocates were happy to 
be able to own their own homes through the Home-Ownership Scheme 
implemented by the Government. These factors outweighed the disadvantages 
of relocation, and helped resettlers overcome the hardship of shifting away 
from the old ways of life where income was stable, neighbours were familiar, 
and the land gave them financial independence. 
 
3.4 Change of Perception during Transition Phase of Resettlement 
 
 The respondents were asked to share their perception on whether the 
sentiments of their family members, neighbours or community changed during 
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the period between the time they first knew about the imminent resettlement 
and when they physically occupied the new public housing dwelling. Their 
response is presented in Graph 4.14 below. 
 
 
Diagram 4.15: Graph showing Change of Perception 
during Transition Phase of Resettlement 
 
Four of the ten respondents shared that their families’, neighbours’ and 
communities’ sentiments changed. Three others stated that it did not change. 
This question was not applicable to three of the respondent as either their 
village’s general transition period of less than one month was too short to effect 
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3.5 Elaboration on the Change of Perception during Transition Phase 
of Resettlement 
 
 Next, the respondents who shared that families’, neighbours’ and 
communities’ sentiments changed during the transition period were asked to 
share and elaborate on their reasons for the change. They shared that: 
  
1) They became happier when they visited the new flats. 
They were happy with environment. Also, the compensation 
by the Government is reasonable. All these factors made 
them more certain of new life and affordability; 
 
2) They became happier as they received more information 
about the new life. It helped them become more certain of the 
new life and its affordability. Also, they saw that everyone is 
moving. So they just went along; 
 
3) Happier because of looking forward to better living 
environment. 
 
Similar to the findings for individual respondents, the key reason is that 
they had preview of their new public housing flat. The preview too confirmed 





4. FINDINGS FOR RESISTANCE (OR LACK THEREOF) 
TOWARDS RESETTLEMENT 
 
 The respondents were asked to share about the presence of absence of 
resistance in their resettlement experience, and the reason behind those 
presence and absence. The findings from these series of questions and sharing 
are critical to this study. The previous sections have established that the general 
sentiments towards resettlement were positive. As such, the study seeks to 
investigate if, in this positive climate, were there still resistance, and if so, what 
happened? What caused those resistance? This section presents their sharing on 
both personal experiences, and those of their families’, neighbours’ and 
communities’. 
 
4.1 Presence of Resistance towards Resettlement 
 
The respondents were first asked whether there were cases of resistance 
either by themselves, or by the families, neighbours and communities they 
represent. The findings are presented in Graph 4.15. Two of the ten respondents 
indicated the presence of resistance, while five stated that there were no 
resistance. This question was not applicable to three of the respondent as either 
their village’s general transition period of less than one month was too short to 





Diagram 4.16: Graph showing Resistance towards Resettlement 
 
4.2 Elaboration on Resistance towards Resettlement 
 
 For the two cases of resistance, their sharing is paraphrased here: 
 
1) There was a group of elders we call the “old guards”. They 
are the headsmen and seniors of the community. They did not 
want to move. But eventually, most of them left after a fire 
broke out and destroyed much of the village. Even then, some 
of the old guards stayed. They moved out in the end only after 
they saw the new buildings (including the Golden Mile 
Complex) coming up around them; 
 
2) A few older folks stay in their houses until the last moments 












did not put up a fight. 
 
4.3 Reasons for Absence of Resistance towards Resettlement 
 
 The respondents who indicated that there were no resistance were asked 
to elaborate on the reasons behind the lack of resistance. Also, the two 
respondents who shared the cases of resistance were asked about why those 
resistances eventually fizzled out without become large scale resistance. The 
findings are presented in Graph 4.16. Four of the seven respondents indicated 
that the primary reason for a lack of resistance was that people felt that 
resistance would be futile and the Government-sent demolition contractors will 
come and do their work. No individuals or community bodies were strong 
enough to resist this top-down decree. Two other respondents indicated that 
most people did not want to fall into the wrong side of the law, and thus getting 
themselves into trouble with the authorities. One respondent indicated that the 
people simply did not wish to do anything about any unhappiness. Another 
respondent cited the same reason as a secondary reason. Two other responses 
indicated, as secondary reasons, the fact that people trust the Government to do 










4.4 Elaboration on Absence of Resistance towards Resettlement 
 
 The respondents were then asked to elaborate on the reasons of low 
resistance to resettlement. Their elaborations are paraphrased here: 
 
1) Our generation, no matter how resistant to change, or how 
attached they are to the old way of life, they are no “fighter 
cocks”. They will “tahan” (resist) the resettlement until the last 
moments when the bull-dozers come in, then they will move. 
They do have children who have moved into HDB flats. So they 
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kampong is a “sacred” place. “Nobody should fool around this 
place”. The spirit of the kampong is strong. During the racial 
riots, some men laid down their lives at the gates to the 
kampong to protect the villagers. So they were deeply attached 
to the kampong and find it hard to leave. But eventually, the idea 
of a roof over the head is still the key factor; 
 
2) Firstly, they do not want to get into trouble with the 
authorities. Secondly, their children are already in HDB flats. 
Thirdly, they do not want to be anti-social /  a trouble-maker. 
Fourthly, they gave in because they believe in the leadership of 
the Government. These folks have been through hard times like 
WWII, and they do believe that the move will actually be an 
upgrade in standard of living for them, so they do not resist; 
 
3) Most of the village houses are built on a landlord's land. So 
when the villagers were compensated even for their structures 
and trees they erected and planted, they are happy.  More 
fundamentally, at this stage of the resettlement, there are already 
so many villages that have been resettled. It was only a matter of 
time. Everyone just moved along with the flow; 
 




 There are some new themes evident in the findings of this section. 
These are in addition to the themes that have already emerged and were 
discussed in earlier sections. Why did negative sentiments, however few there 
were, no translated into resistance? Firstly, Government coercive powers 
mattered. The sense of inevitability of the resettlers were only possible if they 
believed resistance is futile. This prevented any lasting show-down between 
residents and Government apparatuses. Secondly, it emerged that the key 
reasons for negative sentiments and any token resistance were an attachment to 
the land and the old way of life. The findings show that it is usually the older 
generation which felt the lost. But on the other hand, this older generation were 
more salient of the hardships the Singapore Government had managed to 
alleviate, and thus, trust the Government to know what was best for them. 
 
 With the findings presented, this paper will discuss the implications of 
these findings, how they address the literature and data gap, and what they 











1. A LITERATURE AND DATA GAP ADDRESSED 
 
This paper presented a study that set out to investigate the puzzle of 
how did the multitude of causal variables cited in existing literature influenced 
the outcome of a low resistance to resettlement in Singapore between 1965 and 
1985? As many countries are learning from the Singapore experience, 
resolving this puzzle is important to help those countries avoid resistance. 
Resistance towards resettlement undermines any slum-clearance through 
resettlement program. The success of these programs empowers countries to 
address the problems caused by rapid urbanization.  
 
The multitude of causal factors cited in existing literature on 
Singapore’s experience and related works are 1) effective supporting policies, 
2) strong political support, 3) availability of 4) quality and 5) affordable 
housing 6) at a good location, 7) absence of corruption, 8) fair compensation, 
9) a measured approach to eviction, 10) social and cultural factors, and 11) 
geographical factors. However, there is no substantiated discourse on how 
these eleven causal variables influenced the outcome of low resistance - largely 
because of a data gap. There is a lack of studies that investigated why the 




Drawing on an operationalization of preferences - where preferences 
are 1) based on our perceptions of objects or issues which make up our choices, 
2) our perception is formed when we rationalise those object or issue against 
our values, and 3) our values are in turn shaped by our beliefs; in addition to 
drawing on a normative assertion of an existing theory – where Cultural 
Theory posits that a positive policy outcome to a “wicked problem” is a result 
of a “clumsy” approach; a hypothesis was formalized: 
 
The eleven factors shaped the outcome of low resistance 
because the totality of factors constituted a clumsy approach 
which avoided the pitfalls to a viable resettlement program. The 
resulting program catered to the multitude of resettler 
preferences and deterred the realization of any preference to 
resist. 
 
For the hypothesis to be validated, the findings should fulfil three key 
sets of expectations. Firstly, the findings must show the clear causal link 
between the causal factors and the preference of resettlement or the preference 
not to resist resettlement. Secondly, the findings must show that the conditions 
that informed the preference for resettlement are either contextual endowments 
or policies implemented by the Singapore Government as part of the 
resettlement endeavour. Lastly, the findings must show that the conditions that 
deterred resistance to resettlement are either contextual endowments or policies 




This paper has shown how the eleven cited factors constituted a clumsy 
approach; and how this clumsy approach enabled Singapore to negotiate and 
avoid the pitfalls that halted resettlement programs in other Asian countries. 
The findings have allowed this paper to establish a causal link between causal 
factors cited and the successful outcomes of resettlement. In terms of 
contextual endowments, Singapore had favourable conditions that would have 
either made the resettlement agreeable as an option to members of certain ways 
of life, or allowed the avoidance of pitfalls to a viable resettlement program.  
 
Firstly, the Hierarchical conditions of political stability brought about 
by the one-party domination of the Government, the strong mandate given by 
the ruling party, and the financial capacity endowed by a rapidly growing, 
strong and robust economy allow the authorities to effectively carry out their 
resettlement policies. This was evident in the findings where some respondents 
cited trust in the Government and political leadership as their reasons for not 
resisting resettlement. In essence, the clumsy approach catered to a section of 
the population that deferred to a trustworthy authority for decisions such as 
resettlement.   
 
Secondly, seeing from the lenses of the Individualistic way of life, it 
was argued that Singaporeans were willing to resettle to high-density housing 
because they were already familiar with such living conditions, and were not 
highly resistance to change due to the rapidly changing urban and rural 
landscape of Singapore. Also, the innovation from the private sector that gave 
rise to prefabrication techniques and technology reduced the costs of building 
low-cost housing significantly. The latter aspect of a clumsy approach 
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empowers the Government side-step the financial viability problems faced by 
many countries discussed previously. This strength of the Individualistic way 
of life was harnessed effectively by the authorities.  
 
Lastly, Singapore geographical circumstances played into the Fatalistic 
way of life. With reference to Scott’s (2009) discussion about how geography 
determines the extent the long arm of the authorities can reach, Singapore’s 
geography allows the authorities access into the entirety of the sovereign land, 
and does not offer citizens much options to escape physically from 
Governmental policies. This finding was drawn from some respondents’ 
sharing that they had “no choice but to move”, and “the bulldozers will still 
come in the end… so no point resisting”, and that they did not want to “get into 
trouble with the authorities”. In essence, Singapore played her coercion card 
well: not hard enough to create resistance due to oppression, but hard enough 
to deter resistance. 
 
In terms of implemented policies, Singapore’s approach created 
favourable conditions that also would have either made the resettlement 
agreeable as an option to members of certain ways of life, or allowed the 
avoidance of pitfalls to a viable resettlement program. Firstly, some of 
Singapore’s policies in the resettlement approach were consistent with the 
values and outlook inherent in the Egalitarian way of life. By moving entire 
communities or village into the same cluster of public flats, the “group” was 
protected and preserved. By designing flats that were conducive to the family 
unit, the smallest unit of “group” was preserved, and even celebrated as the 
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building blocks of Singaporean society. By upholding a policy of providing 
low-cost housing, Singapore fulfilled the key Egalitarian values of equality and 
accessibility.  
 
This finding was drawn from respondents’ sharing that they did not 
resist resettlement because they have “have access to public amenities”, they 
“look forward to having their own house”, and that the “kampong spirit is still 
there” because “everyone (was) moving to the same place”. In essence, this 
aspect of the clumsy approach created a ‘buy-in’ for a section of the affected 
evictees or resettlers by creating conditions consistent to their way of life, 
which was in line with their preferences. 
 
Secondly, Singapore’s resettlement policies utilized the strengths of the 
Hierarchical way of life to mitigate the pitfalls that a market-based system 
would have created. By creating the Land Acquisition Act to acquire land at 
affordable value, by setting up and maintaining an educated, competent and 
well paid administration to conduct resettlement, by keeping corruption almost 
non-existent, and by improving production processes to reduce cost, Singapore 
was able to side-step pitfalls that plagued many Asian countries. 
 
Thirdly, Singapore’s approach to resettlement addressed concerns that 
typical Individuals will have when considering their own interests. They 
include the availability, affordability, and quality of resettlement housing, how 
they were treated by resettlement officials, whether they were given advanced 
notice, fair compensation, availability of amenities, whether the new housing 
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will improve their quality of life, access to jobs, and even access to an upgrade 
of housing type. Singapore’s approach made sure that these issues did not 
become cause for resistance. This finding was drawn from respondents’ sharing 
that their main reasons for not resisting resettlement is because they look 
forward to an “improvement in quality of life through a better living 
environment”, to ownership of affordable homes in good conditions, to fair 
compensation, and to improved safety. In essence, the clumsy approach made 
sure that the section of population that values Individualist needs above all else 
were appeased, thereby again side-stepping the resistance that arose in other 
countries like India, South Korea and Hong Kong. 
 
Lastly, while typically, no policies are targeted at fatalistic concerns due 
to the fatalists’ withdrawal from public participation, there is however one 
strength of the fatalistic way of life which Singapore drew upon – the merits of 
chance and randomness. This strength was operationalized into a policy of 
random and periodic audit checks on the authorities. This notion that anyone in 
the administration might be subjected to a no-notice audit fostered an 
environment where fatalism was harnessed as a means to prevent corruption.  
 
As shown, the resettlement program conducted by Singapore catered to 
the multitude of preferences for resettlement, and deterred any preference for 
resistance. The clumsy approach allowed Singapore to avoid the many pitfalls 
encountered by other countries attempting resettlement to low-cost housing. To 
illustrate how this clumsy approach influenced the outcome of low resistance 
in Singapore, a case study conducted by Gamer (1972), the only detailed record 
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in existing literature of a case of resistance to resettlement, was reviewed 
against the hypothesis in the next section.  
 
 
2. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS ON A CASE STUDY 
 
In 1963, the authorities embarked on a resettlement program in the 
Kallang Basin, just east of the city. The Kallang project was not a 
straightforward one as much of the land was owned privately, and the rest, 
while government-owned, were rented out cheaply to families which paid a 
small rent, or were occupied by squatters (66). The basin contained 4072 
families, out of which 3759 were squatters. The inhabitants of Kallang Basin 
had lived there for many years, forming close bonds to the community (67). 
Many had their livelihoods in the area as shopkeepers or “small manufacturing 
pursuits” (Ibid).  
 
From the on-start, resettlement officers “were not having an easy time” 
(68). One officer reported that while he had served 119 eviction notices, with 
81 families indicating that they were interested in public housing, only eight 
families had subsequently accepted the flats (Ibid). The reasons cited for a 
preference to stay were that the flats assigned were too far away and that the 
rents were too high. Furthermore, it was recorded that residents felt that the 
resettlement was a “cunning scheme designed to destroy the unity of the 
people” (69). The Rural Dwellers’ Association (RDA) was nominated to fight 
for the rights of evictees. The RDA was empowered to demand “reasonable 
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compensation and arrangements for livelihood after resettlement” and to 
negotiate with HDB regarding resettlement problems (Ibid). 
 
 When the bulldozers came, residents began blocking the path of the 
machines. The Permanent Secretary of National Development was summoned. 
He explained the policies to the residents, and accompanied resettlement 
officer from door to door (70). Many farmers were promised luxurious 
Bungalow-typed houses to be built in a nearby estate. In this manner, 
resettlement continued for a few months. When the ruling party established 
their political dominance, they deregistered the RDA, and had chief 
troublemakers arrested (Ibid). Consequently, organized resistance “could not be 
easily established”. However sporadic resistance continued. 
 
 In 1965, there were many instances where settlers “refused to move 
until the last minute, and the authorities were forced to carry through with their 
threats of demolition (71). 80 huts were demolished while settlers protested. A 
reserve unit of policemen “stood by to prevent any incidents” (Ibid). Learning 
from these incidents, the Government assigned the Citizens’ Consultative 
Committees (CCC), a grassroots organization, to handle all recourse for the 
resettlers. The CCCs assisted the resettlers in getting the fullest benefits from 
existing rules, and even managed to push for policy changes to benefit 
resettlers. In July 1965, 100 residents held a special meeting with the Member 
of Parliament (MP) to demand a settlement on eviction issues. The MP 
responded swiftly, met with HDB officials, got the resettlers fair compensation. 





 Before 1966, the authorities grappled with difficulties in land 
acquisition, which was a slow and tedious process. In December 1966, a new 
acquisition law was instated by the government which gave the settlement 
authorities flexibility and financial support for acquisition. While acquisition 
was expensive, it provided the authorities reprieve from resistance due to unfair 
compensation. Over the next six years, the Kallang Basin resettlement project 
was completed with no further major incidents. 
 
 The Kallang Basin project was conducted in the years before, and in the 
beginning of, the time period of 1965 to 1985. The project was significant 
because, as current literature detailed, most of the resettlement policies that 
were used to conduct resettlement between 1965 and 1985 were instated during 
the period of learning during the Kallang Basin project. Thus, this case study 
captured how the authorities were hampered by resistance before 1965, learned 
and adopted new approaches to resettlement, and saw a dramatic reduction in 
resistance from 1965 onwards.  
 
 In the context of our study, the Kallang Basin project represented a shift 
from elegant heavy-handed approach by the authorities to a clumsy approach. 
The project showed that initially, while coercive powers were strong, resistance 
prevailed. A preference for resistance to resettlement stemmed from a 
multitude of reasons like unfair compensation, affordability and poor location 
of new housing, and the disintegration of the community. The authorities 
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responded by tackling all the angles of the problem. Housing policies were 
changed, compensation rules were made more attractive, housing options were 
constructed near Kallang, and coercive powers were utilized to weed out local 
resistance leaders and enforce eviction. This multi-prong approach constituted 
a clumsy one. As such, the Kallang Basin case serves to support the general 
findings of this study to validate the hypothesis to a considerable extent. 
 
3. LESSONS FOR ASIAN COUNTRIES SEEKING TO LEARN FROM 
SINGAPORE’S RESETTLEMENT TO PUBLIC HOUSING EXPERIENCE 
 
Can the causal flow and mechanism in Singapore’s case be 
generalizable to the unique contexts of Asian countries seeking to learn from 
Singapore’s resettlement to public housing experience? This paper argues yes. 
The hypothesis of a clumsy solution as the key mechanism that allowed a set of 
causal variables to, in totality, influence the outcome of low resistance as it 
catered to the multitude of preference for resettlement and deterred any 
preference for resistance, was drawn from the normative assertion of the 
Cultural Theory. This assertion has been applied in to compare the case of 
Munich and Birmingham, which have very different contexts from Singapore. 
As such, the argument (that a totality of variables made up of contextual 
endowments and deliberate policies that constitute a clumsy approach can 
influence positive outcomes to a large extent) can be generalized to other Asian 
cases. 
 
This paper argues that the key reason that most Asian countries’ 
resettlement efforts did not lead to positive outcomes, and are met with 
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resistance, is that their resettlement approach is not clumsy. In Thailand, the 
lack of government support and funding (Hierarchical) was the key reason why 
their resettlement endeavour did not take off. Unlike the findings in 
Singapore’s case – where a consistent political and leadership commitment to 
the resettlement to public housing project offered the financial, policy, and 
regulatory resources needed by the endeavour – the NHA of Thailand had to 
resort to build housing for middle to upper-income Thais to build up funds for 
their task of providing low cost housing. This deviation from their primary task 
was a response to the reduction of subsidies from the Thai Government. 
 
Compared to Singapore, Thailand did not have the hierarchical 
contextual endowments Singapore enjoyed. Thailand did not have the political 
stability and support as the incumbent Government of the young democracy of 
Thailand was constantly threatened and destabilised by political challenges 
from opposition parties and the army. Without stability, the Thai Government 
could not allocate resources to cater to poor citizens who do not hold as much 
political influence as the middle and upper class. Thailand also did not have the 
financial prowess of Singapore during the period of strong economic growth 
from the 60s to the 80s. A competent administration, educated workforce and a 
stable geo-political environment enabled Singapore to attracted investors to 
spur Singapore’s economy. Thailand did not have these attributes. Furthermore, 
Thailand’s resettlement projects like the Suwan Prasid 2 Resettlement Project 
was met with resistance because of the unfair compensation to slum occupants – 




As such, Thailand was not successful in providing low-cost housing or 
relocate slum-dwellers as their approach did not mitigate the lack of 
hierarchical endowments like political stability, policy support, and financial 
prowess. Furthermore, their approach did not cater to the individualist needs of 
fair compensation. Compared to Singapore’s clumsy approach, Thailand’s had 
too many gaps to avoid resistance or policy failure. In contemporary times, 
while Thailand’s economy has grown - thus giving them more spending power, 
their politics are still unstable, with poor living conditions of the urban poor a 
key reason for demonstrations against the Government. Thus, unless Thailand’s 
politics can settle, there will be limitations to Thailand going the Singapore 
clumsy approach way. 
 
In Hong Kong, the neglect of Individualists’ needs of good locations of 
resettlement housing and basic amenities was the main reason for the series of 
resistance to resettlement in 1959. The resettlement forced many evictees to 
trade better housing for poorer ease of commute. Some evictees were resettled 
to public waste land where public amenities and utilities like water, gas, and 
sanitation were absent. In Singapore, this issue was mitigated by relocating 
urban slum dwellers to estates at the fringe of the city, and relocating rural 
slum dwellers to apartments with good amenities in satellite towns that are 
served by a rail network. Places of employment are also built near to these 
towns. Evidently, Singapore’s resettlement efforts took into account the 
individual’s needs, an effort not present in Hong Kong’s case.  
 
When compared, Singapore and Hong Kong have strong similarities in 
141 
 
terms of contextual endowments. Both were British Colonies and inherited a 
stable system of Governance, both are members of the “Asian Tigers”, and 
both are severely limited by their lack of geographical endowments. Thus, with 
these factors controlled for, it can be argued that Hong Kong’s encounter of 
resistance was due to a deviation from a clumsy when the needs of a way of 
life were neglected.  
 
Like Hong Kong, in India, individual needs for proper resettlement 
housing and egalitarian needs for equal access to sanitation, water, and 
amenities were casted aside when politics and market forces took precedence. 
Redress raised through official channels did not stop forced evictions. This 
represents a failure on the authority’s part to listen to individual concerns.  
However, India was not in a position to go the clumsy way like Singapore. 
India’s mammoth and inefficient bureaucracy, the instability of local politics, 
and an economic trajectory where benefits hardly trickle down to the poor, puts 
the Indian Government in an impossible position to make their resettlement 
policies clumsy. Unless the above issues are addressed – which till today are 
hardly resolved – India’s resettlement of urban poor endeavour will be marred 
with difficulties. 
 
In Malaysia, by depending on the private (Individualist) sector as the 
main provider of housing, and by depending on market forces, the housing 
endeavour was met with a severe lack of low-cost housing, problems of project 
abandonment, and profiteering by private developers at the expense of the 
poor. When compared to Singapore’s clumsy approach, Malaysia neglected the 
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merits of hierarchical policies that could have mitigated the failures caused by 
the reliance on private developers.  
 
If Malaysia had in place a competent administration that oversees 
resettlement to low-cost housing, they would have been able to keep a tighter 
control on the development direction of the projects, ensuring low-cost housing 
are built – instead of the more profitable housing for middle to upper income 
citizens. Furthermore, like Singapore, Malaysia could have provided subsidies 
to private developers to build low-cost housing. This could have prevented the 
problems of project abandonment that plagued Malaysian projects. As such, 
Malaysia’s elegant dependence on the Individualist way of conducting 
resettlement to public housing was a key factor to the failure of the endeavour. 
Unlike Thailand, Malaysia’s politics was stable. The grip on politics by the 
incumbent was as strong as Singapore’s. Coupled with a reasonably strong 
economy, Malaysia would have done well in addressing the housing for urban 
poor issue if they had adopted a clumsy approach. 
 
In the Philippines, the (Hierarchical) lack of top-down management and 
support for housing programs caused the outcome of program failure. 
Government coercive forces were instead deployed to aid the eviction of 
squatters.  This reliance on the hierarchical way neglected the merits of other 
ways of life; and neglected the preferences that when addressed, would have 
prevented resistance. In Singapore, coercive force was used, but only when 
efforts that address concerns consistent with the other ways of life were 
addressed. The result of the evictees settling down in their new dwellings is in 
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sharp contrast with Philippine’s where 36% of the resettled families returned 
the Manila slums. Collective resistance efforts by Manila slum dwellers were 
disbanded, again by coercive forces. Manila today, with its slum colonies still 
standing strong, is a testimony that an over-reliance on a single way of life does 
not lead to policy success. With the political power base still residing in the 
control of elites, where corruption and ugly political battles are commonplace, 
the way to a clumsy resolution to Manila’s slum problems will be challenging. 
 
 In South Korea, the elegant approach dominated by the collaboration of 
the authorities (Hierarchical) and private developers (Individualist) neglected 
the individual needs of affordable and quality housing in a good location, with 
fair compensation (Individualist needs), and egalitarian needs of equal access 
to jobs, amenities, and housing loans. This led to decades of resettlement 
targets not been met, with squatters returning to city slums after been forcibly 
evicted. Would the Singapore clumsy approach have influenced a successful 
resolution to South Korea’s slum problem much early on?  
 
When we compare the endowments that Singapore and South Korea 
had, in fact, South Korea would have done better than Singapore. South Korea 
had a strong government, coercive power, and economy. It was part of the 
quartet of “Asian Tigers” economic-growth powerhouse which Singapore was 
a part of. If there was a political will, the South Korea Government could have 
wielded a tighter control over building policies to mitigate the gaps which 
surfaced when there is an over-reliance on private developers – as was the case 
of Malaysia. South Korea also had the ability to impose laws to drive out 
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corruption – a source of poor building policy outcomes; and to provide low-
interest housing loans to the urban poor. Evidently, South Korea’s approach 
was non-clumsy as it did not make use of the merits of hierarchical approach, 
and neglected the preferences of individuals affected. South Korea was the one 
country that could have easily adopted the Singapore clumsy way – but they 
did not, and 20 years of development was hampered. 
 
As shown, the key reason for the difficulties in resettlement and 
provision of low-cost housing was that the approaches adopted were not 
clumsy. At least one of the ways of life was neglected. This created pitfalls that 
hampered positive outcomes. Indeed, Singapore’s experience provides a lesson 
that these Asian countries could use to reflect on their own experience, even if 
their contexts are vastly different.  
 
In recent times, countries like China, Vietnam and Myanmar are 
engaging Singapore’s expertise to guide and assist in their own resettlement to 
low-cost housing endeavours. Each of these countries are growing economic 
powerhouses, and have or will possess the hierarchical endowments that 
Singapore enjoyed. Thus, while learning from Singapore, they must be mindful 
of the clumsy approach that made Singapore’s endeavour successful. As 
described in detail throughout this paper, China, Vietnam and Myanmar must 
bring their hierarchical endowments to bear, implement the hierarchical 
policies that will mitigate the shortcomings of other ways of life, and 
implement policy measures that cater to the preferences of the Individualist and 






This paper presented a study design to investigate the causes of a low 
level of resistance by urban slum- and rural kampong-dwellers in Singapore 
towards resettlement to public housing between 1965 and 1985. Through an in-
depth ethnographical study recording the perceptions of ten respondents and 
their views on the perceptions of their families, neighbours or communities, the 
study found that firstly, the eleven causal factors of 1) effective supporting 
policies, 2) strong political support, 3) availability of 4) quality and 5) 
affordable housing 6) at a good location, 7) absence of corruption, 8) fair 
compensation, 9) a measured approach to eviction, 10) social and cultural 
factors, and 11) geographical factors cited in existing literature constituted a 
clumsy approach.  
 
This clumsy approach enabled Singapore to avoid the pitfalls that 
halted resettlement programs in other Asian countries. The findings validate 
that the resettlement program catered to the multitude of preferences for 
resettlement, and deterred any preference for resistance. This study was a 
response to a literature and data gap in the extensive literature on Singapore’s 
housing experience. While the existing literature that focused on Singapore 
documented and analysed in significant detail the mechanisms behind the 
relatively successful slum-clearance through resettlement to public housing 
program, there are no substantial discourse on the reasons behind the low level 
of resistance to resettlement. Resistance had been recorded in the experiences 
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of most other countries in Asia. But in Singapore, there were a large number of 
resettlers who volunteered for resettlement into public housing. Why was 
Singapore different? In addition, while massive quantitative and in-depth 
qualitative studies were conducted on the resettlement experience, no studies 
have focused on the investigation of why the resettlers did not resist.  
 
This literature and data gap needed to be addressed as the knowledge of 
the conditions needed for low-resistance to relocation to public housing will 
aid countries learning from Singapore’s experience to implement their 
programs more effectively. Many Asian countries had embarked on slum 
clearing through resettlement to low-cost housing programs, but met with 
crippling obstacles that some countries eventually found to be insurmountable. 
In countries like Thailand, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, South 
Korea, and the Philippines, problems of poor political and Governmental 
support of resettlement and public housing programs, misalignment of private 
and public developers’ objectives, harsh eviction approaches, corruption, and 
ineffective policies are holding back the States’ ability to address the growing 
problems posed by rapid urbanization - a pressing contemporary global issue 
that weighs heavily on the well-being of millions of people. 
 
The findings of this paper addressed the literature and data gap with the 
contribution of a set of structured interviews of resettlers that give us a glimpse 
into the sentiments and reasons behind the preference of not resisting, or not 
acting on any preference of resisting. By organizing the anecdotal evidence 
with an analytical tool provided by Cultural Theory, this paper showed how the 
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causal factors to low resistance in Singapore’s resettlement to public housing 
experience cited in existing literature lead to the successful outcomes.  
 
This paper serves as a departure point to address the literature and data 
gap present in the works on Singapore’s resettlement experience. The scope of 
this research endeavour is meant to present how fieldwork that studies this 
aspect of resettlement experience, when coupled with a theoretical framework, 
can yield insights into how causal factors influence successful outcomes. This 
causal relationship is a salient part of what countries learning from Singapore 
must take note. It allows Singapore’s lessons to be more effectively applied to 
countries with varying contexts. 
 
That said, further research into this topic is required to acquire greater 
validity to the causal relationship. This paper was only able to interview ten 
sets of interviewees. The small-n sample, while adequate for the analytical 
purposes of this study, will be inadequate to support any work that forms the 
basis of policy-formulation or discourse that affects the lives of thousands in 
growing economies. This paper encourages researches to pick up on the local 
groundwork done by the study, further test the merits of the Grid-Group 
Framework, and the claim that a clumsy approach is fundamental to policy 
success.  
 
Another aspect of inquiry that is beyond the scope of this paper is to 
test the hypothesis on the experiences of other countries that have successful 
resettlement to low-cost housing experiences. They include South Korea from 
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the 1980s onwards, contemporary China, and Japan. Using the structure of 
inquiry that guided this study, one can ascertain if the approaches adopted by 
these countries are also clumsy. If so, the claims of this paper will be further 
validated, and the insights can be referenced with greater confidence, to the 
benefits of countries learning from Singapore. The framework of this study can 
also allow developing countries to not just learn from Singapore, but to study 
the experiences of other countries. However, if the experiences of other 
successful examples are non-clumsy in essence, further studies are encouraged 
to inquire the variance that allows them to achieve success without a clumsy 
approach. 
 
Resettlement to low-cost or public housing is an endeavour that affects 
millions around the world, and will continue to affect millions more. The 
conditions of the urban poor are not improving in many countries, and are 
definitely getting worse in some. With the world population growing, 
especially in cities, much needs to be done to address this issue. This paper is a 
small step in studying how resettlement efforts can be conducted successfully. 
With the contributions of further studies, the literature that informs resettlement 
policy formulation can be more comprehensive and useful to those who are 






ANNEX A: SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW FORM 
 
Sample Number: __________ 
 
PART I: Background 
 
1 Year of Birth  
2 What year were you relocated?  
3 Where was your residence before relocation?  
4 Approximately how many residents were there in 
your immediate community before you relocated? 
 
5 Where were you relocated to?  
6 Reason for relocation? (Voluntary, Eviction, etc)  
7 What is your ethnicity and dialect group?  
 
PART II: Your feelings towards relocation 
 




Negative Neutral Positive Extremely 
Positive 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q2. What word best describe your feelings at that time? 
 
Happy Hopeful Concerned Upset Fearful 
Unhappy Hopeless Anxious Uncertain Indifferent 
 
Or Others (please indicate):_______________ 
 
Q3. Why do you feel so? 
 


























Q4. Approximately how long was the period between the time you were 
first informed of the relocation until the day before you moved into the 
new flat? 
(Fill in the blanks) 
 
Years and Months 
  
 
Q5. During this period, did your feelings towards relocating change 



























PART III: Your relatives' / neighbours' feelings towards relocation 
 
Q6. What were your relatives' or neighbours' feelings towards 




Negative Neutral Positive Extremely 
Positive 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q7. What word best describe their feelings at that time? 
 
Happy Hopeful Concerned Upset Fearful 
Unhappy Hopeless Anxious Uncertain Indifferent 
 
Or Others (please indicate):_______________ 
 
Q8. Why do they feel so? 
 
 































Q9 Approximately how long was the period between the time you were 
first informed of the relocation until the day before you moved into the 
new flat? 
(Fill in the blanks) 
 




Q10. During this period, did your feelings towards relocating change 



















PART IV: Reactions towards relocation 
 
Q11. If your relatives' /  neighbours' or your feelings were ever negative 
during the initial phase and transition phase of relocation, did they / you 

















Q12b. If not, what was your reason(s) for not resisting? 
 
I /  they did not resist because... 
1 It will not make a difference  
2 They / I simply do not wish to do anything about it  
3 They / I will get in trouble with the authorities  
4 They / I do not know what channels are available to me  
 
Or Others (please 
indicate):________________________________________________ 
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